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INLUCETUA
Comment by the Editor

And Some Have Greatness Thrust Upon Them
Another book from Allan Bloom, and more words
from the experts about what the educted ought to read
if they are to consider themselves educated. Donald
McCloskey, reviewing Bloom's book in the Chicago
Tribune this week, makes a comment that it is "pathetic
that Harvard, for example, prides itself on a 'core' that
exempts students from having to learn anything about
Socrates or Aquinas." The tone of these words rings
with the scandalized gentility of the lady who learns
that a friend is being married without the requisite two
dozen hand-hemmed camisoles in her trousseau.
"Mercy! exempt from Socrates and Aquinas...what can
we be coming to!" It is yet another of the outcries of
those who appear to believe that when the canon is
threatened, civilization as we know it will fall .
Given the specifics of the phrase 'as we know it' we
might well ask what we have to lose. Generations of
people who knew something about Socrates and
Aquinas have operated in the world without the world's
experiencing thereby any perceptible increase of joy,
or peace, or even sweetness and light. It would be
churlish (meaning, of course, typical of someone who
has been exempt from having to learn anything about
Socrates and Aquinas) to comment that some of the
power of great books, particularly in a curriculum,
comes from the way they are regarded by people we
have agreed to call great. Mortimer Adler, who is a
kind of rabbi without a Torah, identifies another set of
tablets, and proceeds to teach us how to study them
with reverence. Of course he teaches about them with
eloquence, and power, and skill, and lucidity.
According to McCloskey, those terms apply as well to
Bloom's teaching of the Republic and Richard II and
Emili! in this latest book, and I have no doubt that he is
right. Further, I have no doubt that the works are
great ones, and that they deserve and will reward disciplined study and attention.
No, the objection I want to raise to the tone of
anguish as great texts are discussed is an objection to a
limited idea of greatness, too readily assumed by the
vocally adept academic elites with access to big publishNovember, 1990

ers, and too readily accepted by those who buy their
books. It is, in fact, with greatness and how we measure it that my concerns rest, for it appears to me that
our concept is far too small and narrow to be of use.
Bloom's title, Giants and Dwarfs, has several referents,
because he discusses Gulliver's Travels, as well as the
limitations of a present-centered view. Certainly we are
fatally limited if we hear only on the voices of the present; certainly we are poor indeed if we rely only on the
wisdom of our own time. For our sanity, and for perspective-for wisdom itself-we need the voices of the
past But we need to hear them, not merely to have
checked them off on a list of required texts. Merely to
have the right titles on a syllabus is hardly a guarantee,
it is hardly even a sign, that the voices are being heard.
All those hearty undergrads who have dozed through
lectures on Socrates and Aquinas can scarcely be said
to be educated, however unexempt they were from the
requirements of acquaintenceship.
And in what ways shall we hear them, these voices
of the great dead writers? Bloom and others suggest
that we must hear them in the attitude of disciples, submitting our own experience to theirs, patiently
absorbing and accepting and assimilating, until we can
at length, as the result of apprenticeship to them as
thinkers, join worthily in the conversation of the educated. But I think that the demands on us made by
dead greatness need limits. The great need to be subject to our questions about their limitations. They
need to be heard in a context which is missing, and
which it may be almost impossible to supply. As Peggy
Mcintosh suggests in her essay about really new thinking about the curriculum, they need to be read in the
light of the surroundings which permitted them to
write and think, while others kept the fire going, and
shovelled out the stables, and ran the presses. "You
never see in English courses anything about all the
women who were preparing Emerson's meals while he
wrote 'Self Reliance.' " Our definitions of greatness
have kept us from seeing life whole, and from valuing-and even studying-those parts which make life
possible.
Anti-intellectuals have convinced us that this sort
of accusation is their territory; the argument about
3

what to study has been framed in the context of their
demands for reality and relevance and the development of effective learning skills and so forth. Against
these critics, intellectuals have countered with stronger
and stronger demands for the great classics of the past,
the immutable and stately rhythms of eternal wisdom.
But both sides miss an important point. What we call
the greatness of the great texts is only a partial record
and a partial response to what was important in the life
and thought of the past. We must listen to what they
say about human life and history, and we must hear
what it is they do not say. For greatness goes far
beyond the words of the great.
If we were to teach ourselves about the past, we
would begin to fmd ways to learn more profoundly the
truths we say but do not mean when it comes to learning. As Christians, we can recite the Beatitudes, but we
still shape our learning around the non-meek, the nonpoor in spirit, the non-merciful, the non-peacemakers.
I wonder about another version of greatness, and the
impact it might make on our students.
Peace,

GME

0
Editor's note:
As The Cresset's contribution to the comment on
Richard John Neuhaus's announcement of his conversion to the Roman Catholic communion, we are happy
to have these words from Edward Gaffney, the Dean of
the School of Law at VU. Mr. Gaffney, before studying
law, served on the staff of the Bishops' Committee on
Ecumenical and Interreligious Relations, where he
assisted in Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogues.

Lead, Kindly Light: Newman and Neuhaus
Rarely at a loss for words, Richard John Neuhaus
needs no one to explain his choices. A few words may
still be in order from a long-time friend on the Roman
side, as both communions seek the meaning in his
decision, at once personal and public. Neuhaus is no
Newman, but a comparison with the nineteenth-century Cardinal bears some exploration.
In 1845 John Henry Newman, a powerful intellectual leader in the Oxford Movement, left the Anglican
communion and became a Roman Catholic. For both
Newman and Neuhaus, the intensely personal choice
of leaving the group in which they had received their
spiritual nurture for half a century was difficult, made
4

after years of deep spiritual reflection. In his famous
hymn, "Lead, Kindly Light," Newman prayed: "Amid
the encircling gloom, lead thou me on .... I do not ask
to see the .distant scene, One step alone enough for
me." In an interview with Peter Steinfels of the New
York Times, Neuhaus tells us that he wrestled with this
decision - even resisted it - for a long while because
his sense of vocation meant that "you should generally
stay where God put you and do your duty there. For me
that was as a Lutheran and as a Lutheran pastor."
For Newman the move to Rome was preceded in
1841 by the last of the Tracts for our Times, No. XC, in
which he argued that the Thirty-Nine Articles of the
Church of England are basically Catholic. Once
Newman came to doubt the soundness of that view, he
withdrew from his pastorate at Oxford to write his
probing Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, the
publication of which coincided with his reception into
the Roman Catholic Church.
Neuhaus' move was preceded in 1987 by an important volume, The Catholic Moment, in which he
suggested that the tradition, size, and resources of the
Roman Catholic Church in the United States uniquely
equip it to provide a vital role of moral leadership in
this country at this point in our history. Both before
and after this essay Neuhaus has extolled the late John
Courtney Murray for his singular efforts to achieve a
morally informed public philosophy appropriate for
our culture. This view of the potential contribution
that Roman Catholics can make to our culture, however, was not the driving force for Neuhaus' decision to
become a Catholic. Instead, he insists, he has joined
the Roman Catholic Church because he believes that it
is "the fullest expression of the church of Christ
through time" and that he "could no longer give an
answer convincing to others or to me as to why I am
not a Roman Catholic."
Roman Catholics were latecomers to the stirring of
the Spirit known as the ecumenical movement. But
once the Roman church got the point of this movement in the Second Vatican Council, it has not
withdrawn from the task of interfaith dialogue with
other Christians. The work of bilateral conversations
with communions stemming from the Reformation has
been serious and fruitful. Roman Catholics and their
Lutheran brothers and sisters have learned to appreciate one another's faith. Although this process is by no
means complete, it is fair to say that the central convictions of the Reformers (justification by faith, the role
of Scripture in the life of the church, worship in the
vernacular, the priesthood of all believers) are now
taken very seriously in the life and teaching of the
Roman Catholic Church.
Neuhaus' move thus is by no means a slight on the
Reformation, but a sign that-at least for some
The Cresset

Lutherans-the Roman Catholic Church can now be
called their home because it is both reformed and
catholic, truly evangelical and truly apostolic. For that
very reason, this is no time for Catholics to indulge in
smug triumphalism, as though all "right thinking"
Christians must come to the same conclusion that
Newman and Neuhaus reached. On the contrary, as
George Lindbeck intimated in h is open letter to
Neuhaus in The Lutheran Forum, Catholics need to
know that Neuhaus' departure from Lutheranism may
be especially painful to those Lutherans who have been
working within Lutheranism to enable it to be fully
evangelical and fully catholic (with a small c) . Catholics
also need to understand that many Lutherans might
have lingering doubts about the power of the preaching of the Word of God and the celebration of the
Sacrament in Roman Catholicism even after the
reforms ofVatican II. If Neuhaus needed to be shown,
I could take him to several Roman parishes where the
preaching is banal and the liturgy lifeless.
Since none of us knows God's plans or timetable
for the restoration of the gift of unity among
Christians, it is not for us to say whether Neuhaus' decision will retard or accelerate greater organic unity
between Lutherans and Roman Catholics. We can only
pray that God's will be done in His way and time. One
way in which that goal might be facilitated among
Roman Catholics might lean to accept God's will would
be for us to welcome Neuhaus into our company as
one urging us to become more fully evangelical and
less nervous about the value of the Reformation. In
any event, we cannot expect that the ultimate goal of
the ecumenical movement- the full visible unity of all
Christians in a single communion - will be realized
because one Lutheran, even a significant leader like
Neuhaus, decides to become a Roman Catholic, any
more than it will be deterred by one or more transfers
going the other way.
Pastor Neuhaus' desire to become Father
Neuhaus presents some practical (but not insuperable)
difficulties. Is seminary training out of the question for
one who states unabashedly that over the last 20 years
he has probably taken the teaching statements of the
Roman Catholic Church more seriously than many
Roman Catholic theologians? Would a mini-course on
the theological meaning of the collegiality of the bishops suffice for one who so clearly has his favorites
among the hierarchy, and who-like his friend William
Buckley ("Mater Si, Magistra No")-evidently thinks
that all papal encyclicals are equal, but that the ones he
agrees with are more equal than others?
No matter what theological retooling of Pastor
Neuhaus the authorities may deem a prerequisite to
ordination, it should be added that pastoral training
these days focuses on much more than correct ideas. I
Nuunnber, 1990

have sometimes wincedat the way he has not minced
words about those with whom he disagrees, but I am
sure that noone is going to ask Neuhaus to apologize
to the bishops he has flailed for their failure of nerve.
There is little danger that the later Neuhaus will be
bland or flat. One may hope, however, that a kinder
and gentler Neuhaus may yet emerge.
His bishop in the ELCA, William Lazareth, wished
Neuhaus "God's richest blessing in his pilgrimage of
faith." I hope my fellow Catholics are no less generous.
Our welcome to his new-found home whould not be
iffy, or conditioned on his giving up the very things
that make him such an important figure in church life
today: his candor, his acerbic wit, his deep convictions,
his probing mind, and his impatience with muddled
thinking. But as Pastor Neuhaus finds a home among
us, I trust that he will be patient with the truth thatto paraphrase another Pastor, Jesse Jackson - the
Lord hasn't finished with many of us yet. I hope that
Neuhaus will find a home where the bishops (with
whom he disagrees) have as much to say about the economic order as Michael Novak (with whom he agrees).
Although his keen mind (and dare I say characteristically Lutheran view of our flawed world?) has led him
in the past to be skeptical of my "sectarian" claims
about war and peace, I hope he will now find a church
at least as open to the nonviolence of Francis of Assisi,
Dorothy Day of New York, and Teresa of Calcutta, as it
is to the Realpolitik of the just warriors. Most of all, I
hope that the Spirit of light will lead Richard Neuhaus
in a kindly way to find in us a love enabling him to be
at home with the extraordinary diversity of the Spirit
that characterizes the community he has now
embraced.

Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.

0

About this issue
Those readers who enjoyed the three essays last
month by the members of the Cresset Colloquium on
Creation will be pleased now to read the final two contributions on the subject, appearing in this issue, by
Professors Bachman and Caristi. The essay about global communication, its problems and possibilities, by
Professor Shalini Venturelli, made its original appearance as a talk in the Brown Bag series of lunch time
talks by faculty, for faculty, on their work in progress.
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.. .ME AND ALL CREATURES
James V. Bachman

Roderick Nash has written an informative albeit
tendentious history of environmental ethics entitled
'The Rights of Nature. Nash's thesis is that an irresistible
evolutionary march of intellectual history is
systematically transcending and rendering quaint all
previous thought about human responsibility in
relation to the world of nature. I will illustrate his thesis
at work in the book and then give reasons why some of
the older biblical ideas about nature are by no means
as quaint as Nash seems to think.
Nash's thesis permits him to be interested only
in conclusions, not in arguments. He already somehow
knows that "the step-by-step extension of ethics away
from its traditional fixation on people" (152) is the
wave of the future. Thus the more a conclusion
expresses this step-by-step extension the more it is
worthy of acceptance. This clue from history spares
him the painful give and take of argument. In his own
words:
I will not split logical hairs with the philosophers and
theologians nor biological ones with scientists. It seems to me
that the first responsibility of an historian of ideas must be to
report accurately what was thought in the past. If those
thoughts strike some readers as illogical, biased, emotional,
unreasonable, or just plain wrong, the fault, if any, is that of
the thinkers under discussion. (xi)
Nash is in fact wonderfully generous in letting us
know which thoughts should strike us as illogical,
biased, emotional, and wrong. His thesis concerning
the inevitably extending circle of ethical concern and
responsibility is the only tool needed for showing
which ideas should be discarded and which pursued.
He rigorously adheres to his promise not to provide
James Bachman teaches in the Department of Philosophy at
VU. He holds the Eckrich Chair of Religion and the Healing
Arts, and unites frequently for The Cresset. This article is his
response to the Cresset Colloquium on Creation, held during
the spring of 1990. His book, co-authored with Jaakka
Hintikka, What if... ?Toward Excellence in Reasoning,
will be published in December by Mayfield Press.
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any argument.
Nor does he have the patience to sort through
the arguments of those whose work he has undertaken
accurately to report. Philosophers who argue about
ecology and ethics are too often "academic and
esoteric" (124). He is especially exasperated that
philosophers waste time arguing with each other:
Thinking in terms of intellectual history, they might
have seen themselves as colleagues in the step-by-step
extension of ethics away from its traditional fixation on
people. Instead they energetically attempted to undermine
each others' philosophical position. (152)
Here Nash clearly shows his own position. The
conclusions are already known. Argument is simply a
hindrance to the "step-by-step extension of ethics away
from its traditional fixation on people." Nash's is a view
of human thought about environmental ethics in
which an idea requires no rational support other than
the bare fact that it expresses his belief that ethics has
evolved and will continue to evolve from a
preoccupation with the rights of individual human
persons to the correct view as expressed in the
following:
In traditional American liberalism, ethics had always
functioned to protect individual lives against aggregates such
as states or nations. Philosophers assumed that first some
humans, then all humans, then some nonhumans (animals),
and, as the circle widened, all nonhumans (plants, insects,
viruses), had intrinsic value and, it followed for some
thinkers, natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of their
own style of happiness. But the land ethic (l.eopold), ethical
holism (Callicott), an egalitarian type of biocen trism
(Taylor), and deep ecology (N aess) led the most radical
moral philosophers of recent times to conclusions that
devalued the individual life relative to the integrity, diversity,
and continuation of the ecosystem. This understandably
offended many proponents of animal rights, not to speak of
those liberals whose moral community began and ended with
human society. (160)
For those who have not had the benefit of
reading the first 160 pages I provide some notes on
The Cresset

vocabulary. "Traditional," as in traditional American
liberalism, signals due for dumping on the trash heap of
history. "Radical" coupled with "recent," as in the most
radical moral philosophers of recent times, indicates the
inevitable march
of intellectual history.
"Understandably," as in understandably offended,
functions in Nash's vocabulary as a signal that a view
has worn out its welcome in history and that we may
patronizingly dismiss the views of persons mentioned
under this rubric.
So it is that, according to Nash's thesis, ideas
which have a long history are by that very fact suspect
He often packages old ideas in oversimplified forms
and then makes a comment such as: "An
understandable way station on the road" (144) or "But
this was 1971" ( 127) or "But by the 1980s such
opinions sounded increasingly old-fashioned" (120).
This form of nonargument is illustrated nicely in his
approving quotation from an essay by Lynn White,Jr.
Do people have ethical obligations toward rocks?" ...
To almost all Americans, still saturated with ideas historically
dominant in Christianity ... the question makes no sense at
all. If the time comes when to any considerable group of us
such a question is no longer ridiculous, we may be on the
verge of a change of value structures that will make possible
measures to cope with the growing ecologic crisis. One hopes
that there is enough time lefL (cited in Nash, 87)
Nash's only quarrel with White would be that he
should have said "When the time comes . . . . " rather
than "If the time comes .... "
At the risk of sounding old fashioned or perhaps
too saturated in Christianity, I must say that I sincerely
hope that we can address the growing ecologic crisis
without waiting for Americans to evolve a Nashean
consciousness of our ethical obligations toward rocks.
At the risk of sounding even more old fashioned, I
turn now to sketch some reasons why certain ideas
historically found, even if not exactly dominant, in
Christianity deserve serious attention as we attempt to
come to terms with our problematic relationship to the
rest of nature.
Christians have, of course, contributed their fair
share to the environmental crises which confront us
today. Our ecological problems may still, however, be
illumined by the biblical words. Two crucial biblical
themes are neglected in Nash's approach to ecology.
One is the biblical recognition of the ambiguity of our
relationship to nature. The other is the biblical thesis
that a viable interpretation of nature must necessarily
connect with God's words of wrath and redemption.
The neglect of these themes may after all be at the
heart of our environmental crises.
Nash has a naive faith in the self-evidence of the
conclusions he prefers about nature and nature's
rights. He never undertakes to demonstrate how other
Novnnbrr, 1990

competing ideas fail. In his view the devaluing of
individual human life relative to the integrity, diversity,
and continuation of the ecosystem is self-evidently the
goal toward which history is taking us. Preoccupation
with merely human concerns is self-evidently too
narrow. Yet, Nash is aware and provides ample
evidence that in our own time, as well as in the past,
people interpret the data of nature in a startling and
confusing variety of ways.
Some, like Nash, see in nature a marvelous order
that transcends human interest, and they exhort
human beings to respect nature's rights. Others,
however, see in nature the endless conflict of "selfish
DNA." They urge human beings to assert themselves
to the fullest in the midst of and over against nature. In
their view exploitation of nature should be limited only
in so far as the imposition of limits protects the human
species. Still others see in both humanity and nature
only the dance of soulless chance on the stage of an icy
infinity (Thielicke, The Christian's Creed, 37).
Philosophers and theologians continue to argue
over such diverse interpretations of the natural world
precisely because they recognize that one cannot easily
and naively read the significance of the evidence. This
recognition provides one reason for a continuing
consideration of the biblical interpretation of nature.
For the biblical interpretation takes seriously our
ambiguous relationship to the natural world. In the
biblical perspective nature appears both as a
bewildering threat and as a lovely blessing. Nature
appears both grim and grand. In the biblical
perspective the key to interpreting the data is said to lie
not in direct knowledge of the creature but in a right
relationship with the Creator.
Some of us first approached these biblical
notions in the following phrases framed by the
Apostles' Creed and Martin Luther's explanation: "I
believe in God the Father almighty, creator of heaven
and earth. What does this mean 7 I believe that God has
made me and all creatures .... " (Small Catechism, Part
2) In these phrases nature and humanity are not
divided from each other. Human beings and all
creatures alike stand together. Neither has self-evident
significance, and human beings are not given free rein
to make of nature whatever they will or whatever they
dream. Confession of God as Creator is instead
claimed to be the necessary center for interpretation.
One might suspect that Luther added "and all
creatures" to his confession simply as an afterthought,
but in fact Luther was deeply serious about the
affinities between humanity and nature. It was part of
his biblical faith to be instructed by nature and all that
exists. Heinrich Bornkamm's chapter "The Picture of
Nature" in Luther's World of Thought (176 ff.) provides
7

the details. When the topic is Luther and natural
science, most people remember only that Luther
thought Copernicus to be wrong. Luther, however,
genuinely celebrated humanity's advancing knowledge
of nature:
We are now living in the dawn of the future life; for we
are beginning to regain a knowledge of the creation, a
knowledge we had forfeited by the fall of Adam. Now we have
a correct view of the creatures, more so, I suppose, than they
have in the papacy. Erasmus does not concern himself with
this; it interests him little how the fetus is made, formed, and
developed in the womb. Thus he also fails to prize the
excellency of the state of marriage. But by God's mercy we
can begin to recognize His wonderful works and wonders
also in the flowers when we ponder His might and His
goodness. Therefore we laud, magnifY, and thank Him. In
His creatures we recognize the power of His Word. By His
Word everything came into being. This power is evident even
in a peach stone. No matter how hard its shell, in due season
it is forced open by a very soft kernel inside it. All this is
ignored by Erasmus. He looks at the creatures as a cow stares
at a new gate. (Table Ta!Jc 1, 1160; cited in Bornkamm, 184)
Luther was opposed on scientific grounds to
astrology:
I shall never be convinced that astrology should be
numbered among the sciences. And I shall adhere to this
opinion because astrology is entirely without proof. Their
appeal to experience has no effect on me. All the astrological
experiences are purely individual cases. The experts have
taken note of and recorded only those instances which did
not fail; but they took no note of the rest of the attempts,
where they were wrong and the results which they predicted
as certain did not follow. (Genesis Commentary, LWl, 45)
Luther had a robust appreciation of nature. In
fact he believed God to be present everywhere within
the created world. Note, however, that Luther founded
his study of nature not upon its self-evident meaning.
He instead confessed that it is "by God's mercy we can
begin to recognize His wonderful works." He saw
clearly that our experience of nature is ambiguous.
Luther would not be surprised at contemporary
debates over conflicting interpretations of nature and
of humanity's place in it. Nor does he entertain a
sanguine notion that the evolutionary advance of
human thought is making everything clear. Those who
study nature to discover the ultimate meaning of things
exert themselves to ascend to heaven without ladders
(that is, without the Word). Overwhelmed by God's majesty,
which they seek to comprehend without a covering, they fall
to their destruction. . . . forsaking the Word, they each follow
their own thoughts. (LW1,14)
Nature is not so much the revelation as the mask of
the omnipresent God. "Therefore it must be our skill
to distinguish between God and His mask. The world
cannot do this" (Commentary on Galatians [1531],
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cited in Bornkamm, 191). The biblical perspective
thus interprets the continuing philosophical and
scientific arguments about the significance of nature
and humanity's place in it as a sign that understanding
might better begin in the beginning with the
confession "I believe that God has created me and all
creatures."
This biblical interpretation then proceeds to
argue that what God reveals of himself in the Word
provides a coherent way of interpreting the tension we
experience between the beauties and horrors of life in
nature. Here the theme of wrath and redemption
comes to the fore. Commenting on Genesis 3 Luther
says "The earth indeed is innocent and would gladly
produce the best products, but it is prevented by the
curse which was placed upon man because of sin" (LW
1, 205). Because of the enmity between humanity and
the Creator
all creatures are against us, and they are all equipped for
our destruction. How many people are there whom fire and
water destroy? How great is the danger from wild or
poisonous beasts? And they harm not only our bodies but
also the foods which have been produced to support us . ...
Our body bears the traces of God's wrath, which our sin has
deserved. God's wrath also appears on the earth and in all
the creatures.... Although everything on all sides warns us
of God's wrath and all but forces it into our very eyes, we still
ignore it and embrace this life as our only delight. Just as the
signs increase, therefore, the smugness grows, too, and
people become insensible and hardened toward their
misfortunes. (LWl , 208f.)
Precisely this smugness comes through in Nash's
confident, evolutionary hypothesis. To moderns like
Nash biblical language about sin and wrath is, at most,
malleable metaphor manipulable by those who simply
will exert themselves to ascend to heaven without the
covering of the Word. Sadly, some prominent
contemporary theologians lend support to the claim
that theology must necessarily be a manipulating of
metaphors. Sallie McFague, for instance, argues that "I
do not know who God is, but I fmd some models better
than others for constructing an image of God
commensurate with my trust in a God as on the side of
life" ( 192). My trust in God is the measure of what is to
be said about God, and therefore by McFague's own
admission "although this sort of theology 'says much,'
it 'means little'" (xii).
Her theology has come to this pass precisely
because she presumes to mount up to heaven without
ladders. Having reduced Christ to a "paradigmatic
figure" who "expresses and illuminates" a "gracious
power who is on the side of life and its fulfillment,"
( 192) she attempts to approach God apart from his
incarnational covering. As a consequence, just as
Luther predicts, she encounters only God's perplexing
The Cre.sset

masks and can only follow her own thoughts: "The
hints and clues we have of the way things are-whether
we call them experiences, revelation, or whatever-are
too fragile, too little (and more often than not, too
negative) for much more than a hypothesis, a guess, a
projection of a possibility that, although it can be
comprehensive and illuminating, may not be true"

Santmire cites Luther from a sermon on the Gospel of
John:
Now if I believe in God's Son and bear in mind that He
became man, all creatures will appear a hundred times more
beautiful to me than before. Then I will properly appreciate
the sun, the moon, the stars, trees, apples, pears, as I reflect
that he is Lord over and the center of all things. (Santmire,

( 192).

Bornkamm avers that biblical faith bridges "the
great distance between this God, personalized in
Christ, and His hidden vibrant activity and life in all,
and through all, forms in nature" (193). Helmut
Thielicke, asserting that we do not find God in the
things of nature, says, "Rather, once I have found the
Heart, then I understand the things . . . . then it
becomes clear to me what life could be like" (The
Christian's Creed, 40).

The worst result is not that such theology
harmlessly "says much" and "means little." No, those
who reduce theology to word play with model and
metaphor systematically cut us off from the possibility
that God's Word about sin, wrath and grace centered
on the cross of Christ is the reality. Our experiences of
ourselves and of nature, my trust in a God "on the side
of life and its fulfillment," far from governing this
word, are instead to be governed by it. Luther warned
that. a p~rson becomes a theologian not by
mampulatmg models of God and his glory but by
hearing and taking to heart God's Word that humanity
has come under judgment and is every day dying and
being damned. It is a measure of our smug
complacency that we view such talk today as quaint
metaphor appropriate to a late medieval monk but
necessarily called into question by my way of trusting
God. Meanwhile earthquake and tornado, viruses and
STDs, recession, famine and war, oblivious to our
models and metaphors, provide occasions again and
again to ponder whether the biblical words may not be
right. Perhaps we do, after all, stand in danger of being
overwhelmed by God's majesty when we presume
divine insight into ourselves and nature and when we
arrogate the right to strip away God's masks and model
Him as we think best apart from Christ and His cross.
His Word about sin and wrath turns out to be the
reality and our experience of nature becomes the sign
to be interpreted in the light of the Word.
The biblical God is experienced in Nature, but
the interpretation of the experience of God and nature
is subject to the revealed Word. One part of that word
is about human sin and God's wrath. Biblical faith
predicts that no amount of evolving consciousness will
reconcile us with God or with the rest of nature.
Instead God must redeem and we are called to
re~~ntance. Ou.r ecological crisis is also a theological
crlSls. There w1ll be no path to reconciliation with
nature that does not pass through reconciliation with
God.
But the biblical word is above all about Christ's
~haring our death and our sharing His resurrection,
1.e., about God reconciling us and all of nature to
Himself. In his book The Travail of Nature Paul

Nwember, 1990

131)

This biblical perspective thus provides grounds
for responsible human appreciation, celebration, and
stewardship of nature. Humans stand with the rest of
nature in the confession that "God has made me and
all creatures." Humans then take their cue from God's
Word in determining what responsible stewardship will
involve. The conflicts between humanity and the rest of
nature are put into the larger perspective of God's
Word concerning sin and redemption.
In this short essay I have attempted to sketch two
reasons why traditional biblical ideas may continue to
be worthy our study. One reason is that the biblical
interpretation of nature offers a perspective that takes
seriously the ambiguity of our experience of nature
and that suggests an interpretation based upon faith
founded in the Word of God. The other reason is that
a perspective thus based on biblical faith illuminates
both the threatening and the promising aspects of the
created world by connecting them with the realities of
God's Word concerning human sin, death and
resurrection. These connections can be tested in light
of the full range of our experience of nature, of
ourselves, and of nature's God in ways far more
intellectually rigorous than can be Roderick Nash's
monochrome thesis of the evolution of human
thought. The realism of biblical words concerning sin
and grace promises dividends for study that simply are
not to be found in the scheme presupposed in The
Rights of Nature.
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IF WE COULD CHANGE THE DNA OF SPOTTED OWLS
James Caristi

At a conference years ago the lecturer, a
molecular biologist, explained why Science was
different from the Arts and the Humanities. He argued
as follows, "If you put up ten different paintings on the
wall back there, you couldn't say that one of them was
TRUE. You could like one better than the others, but it
would not be reasonable to assert that one is correct.
But in Science, any statements posted on the wall
would be either TRUE or FALSE. Science deals with
FACTS." One of my colleagues, a biologist, challenged
the lecturer on this point during the question and
answer session. My colleague asked whether Science
itself wasn't also lacking in FACTS when we consider,
for example, the replacement of Newtonian
understandings by Einsteinian understandings. The
lecturer's immediate response was "Is the Earth
round?" He seemed to have scored his point that
Science really does deal in FACTS. I wish I had been
quick-witted enough to argue with him. After all, the
Earth looks more like a compressed beach ball than a
perfect mathematical sphere.
The question of what is really meant by a FACT
emerges in making environmental policy. People
debate whether an endangered species will be
threatened by a development project, or whether
global warming is actually taking place, or whether
species survive better in a single large habitat as
opposed to several small ones (the SLOSS issue in
Conservation Science), or whether fires should be
extinguished immediately in a national forest. The
issues often sound like the "Earth roundness" question:
the species are not quite threatened, only
inconvenienced; it's not really getting warmer, we're
only increasing the carbon dioxide level. Sometimes
facts elude us because we can't (or won't) agree on
what we're talking about, or we beg the question.
We can see another aspect of the problem of
Jim Caristi, who was the fifth member of last spring's Cresset
Colloquium, teaches mathematics at VU, and has worked at
Montana State with cereal plant pathologists in the modeUing
of crop diseases. In 1990, he was a recipient of a Sears
Foundation Teaching Excellence Award.
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"facts" in environmental issues when we distinguish the
so-called "hard" from the "soft" sciences. In the "hard"
science of plant pathology, for example, researchers
prove that a particular fungus is pathogenic by using a
variety of rigorous and replicated experiments. Other
scientists can independently validate these experiments
to confirm the results. In the related, but "soft" science
of plant epidemiology, researchers develop and study
complex mathematical models of disease progress.
Lots of laboratory and field experimentation drive
these models, but most of the researchers focus on the
models and their relationship to the real-world
situation. What makes plant epidemiology and other
sciences "soft" seems to be the complexity of the
questions under consideration (complexity in the
sense that there is a multitude of influencing factors
that cannot all be controlled). It is difficult to claim
that an epidemic will result from a given situation,
because any one of dozens of "outliers" might
influence the progress of the disease.
When "hard" facts are difficult to obtain or to
agree upon, people often resort to models. Models
provide a way for dealing with complexity by ignoring
many influencing factors while simultaneously
emphasizing others. For example, Newtonian
mechanics represents the motion of objects fairly well,
though it ignores relativistic effects, as long as the
objects are not moving too rapidly and are not too
massive. Mathematical models of epidemics usually
ignore individual factors such as differences in
susceptibility while emphasizing general quantities
such as the rate of transmission. The problematic
aspect of models arises with the following questions: 1.
How do we handle competing models? 2 . When
should we abandon a model? 3. What are the
limitations of a model? 4. Under what conditions
should we implement decisions based on model
results?
In using models myself I have invoked a "metamodel" that serves to put facts, models, and reality into
some kind of perspective. This higher level model I call
the "Bridge Analogy," and I believe it can be used to
shed light on the use of models in environmental
biology.
The Cresset

The Bridge Analogy refers to the card game,
contract bridge, which is played by four people playing
as partners, two against two. Each person sees only his
or her thirteen cards. With only that information, the
partnership must bid to capture a specified number of
tricks later in the play with a specified suit as trump.
The only thing a person may legally utter refers
directly to determining the number of tricks and the
trump suit. The minimum bid already commits the
partnership to capturing most of the tricks in the play,
and subsequent bids must be higher in some sense.
Thus, there are few statements that a person can legally
make. After determining the level of the contract and
the trump suit, the play begins, and each partnership
strives to maximize the number of tricks it captures.
The laws of bridge are much more complicated than I
have presented, but the important part is that people
enter into a contract and try to capture the most tricks
given extremely limited information.
How should someone who learns the laws of
bridge attempt to play the game? There are many
choices at any given moment. How does one know
which is best? Playing by chance is clearly wrong,
because experienced players play better than
beginners. Experience provides ideas about what
works (and what doesn't) . Through the years, good
players have developed rules of thumb that guide them
through most situations. They have developed methods
of assessing a hand to estimate its playing strength.
They have developed systems of bidding and playing
where a legal bid or play conveys information to the
partner concerning the hand's contents . Experts
codify, publish and teach these rules of thumb,
methods of assessment, and systems of bidding and
playing for others to learn in order to improve their
game.
These additional aspects of bridge that are taught
by the experts I call "rules" for playing bridge well.
These "rules" are to be distinguished from the lAWS
of bridge, which one may never violate. The lAWS of
bridge include following suit if possible, speaking only
legal bids in turn, and so on. The "rules", on the other
hand, suggest what one should do given several
choices: e.g., if you have to lead from ace, king, small,
lead the king. Here, it would not be illegal to lead the
ace or the small card, but to do so risks confusing
partner. If you violate the lAWS of bridge, you will
always be caught, and no one will play bridge with you.
If you violate the "rules" indiscriminately, only
beginners will play bridge with you, but at least you wiJl
be playing bridge.
On many occasions and for a variety of reasons,
good bridge players will break the "rules." They see
that in a particular situation, because they know what
Novnnbtr, 1990

has been played already and they can infer much about
what the other hands contain, the best play would
involve violating a rule. These players use higher
perceptions of the reality of the current game than can
be provided by an inherently statistical "rule." Of
course, they might not assess the situation correctly. In
that case, they bear the blame for any bad results. But
good players realize that they cannot blindly follow
"rules" when the reality behind the "rules" is visible.
In the Bridge Analogy, the lAWS represent facts
about life that we cannot change easily: birds fly and
lay eggs, gravity pulls on everything. "Rules," however,
represent models for behavior. These can be codified
in a religious tradition (Love your neighbor as
yourself), expressed in mathematical symbolism (such
as the Law of mass action), or recited as proverbs
(Waste not, want not). However articulated, "rules"
attempt to guide us toward our best performance. They
are the voice of experience. Many of us rely on "rules"
in everyday life (aphorisms, codes of ethics, etc.)
largely because we don't have all the FACTS. We see
through a glass into the future only darkly. Problems
arise because there are competing, conflicting, and
inadequate models, and because we are unwilling to
abandon those models that are inconsistent with our
total understanding of reality. In the game of bridge,
there are almost as many "rule" systems as there are
players. They vary in complexity, popularity, and
tournament effectiveness. Some players play one
system with one partner and another system with a
different partner. Many systems of play fall victim to
the whim of fashion. Wasn't existentialism fashionable
in many circles in the early 1960's?
For me, the Bridge Analogy supplies several
guidelines for dealing with the problematic aspects of
models. The fact that models compete with one
another in their assumptions and conclusions, in
bridge and in ecology, suggests that models are more
tentative than we often admit. In bridge, players are
free to use whatever bidding systems they wish, if they
declare them properly to the opponents. An ecological
model should hold up under extended scrutiny and
attack. For example, a model may indicate that a
proposed dam will not interfere significantly with an
endangered population of snakes in a river basin. But
if such a model is used in the decision to build the
dam, it should be widely publicized. People should be
given the opportunity to use or test the model in their
own way. Unfortunately, many computer models of
ecological systems are written so poorly that no one
can completely understand and test them. Funding
should be given for developing other, competing
models.
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In bridge, good players easily perceive the
limitations of the "rules," while in the ordinary world,
people may forget or ignore the intended purpose of a
model. In science, models are sometimes constructed
for research-to examine "what if' kinds of situations.
For example, "what if a fungus that attacks aphids kills
them at a rate proportional to the number of live
aphids multiplied by the number of aphids recently
killed by the fungus?" The last sentence is really a
model that can be analyzed mathematically, apart from
any physical reality. People can then decide whether
the assumptions of the aphid/fungus model make any
sense. Problems occur when a model that was intended
for research is used directly in policy decisions. Since
research models are usually created for exploring the
relationships among variables, they do not have to take
many things into consideration. Research models,
therefore, have built-in limitations. It is also not
necessary, for research purposes, to prove the strongest
correlation possible between a model's predictions and
actual events. The aphid/fungus model might be valid
for research, but could give extremely inaccurate
predictions when given actual data.
Good bridge players make decisions based on their
understanding of both the "rules" and the reality of
their current situation. Decision-making in
environmental issues should be at least as complex by
considering facts, models, and political and social
concerns. Often, however, a single corporation or
special interest group controls the decision. For
example, an agri-chemical company may commission
the development of a model to predict the dispersal of
a newly developed pesticide into water systems. The
model builders will know that their model had better
show that water supplies will be safe. The company is
much more likely to consider such a model valid,
because it predicts what they want it to. The
Environmental Protection Agency considers models as
part of an environmental impact statement. So unless
there is a watchdog group with the resources to
develop a competing model, a decision can be affected
significantly by a possibly invalid model.
How should policy decisions be made?
Environmental issues are so complex that we require
models. Yet models have limitations, might be biased,
or might not correspond well with reality. The Bridge
Analogy suggests that we use our models, but temper
them with experience and general knowledge. To see
how this could occur, let us consider an environmental
scenario based on current events, but augmented by a
few fictional discoveries.
Northern spotted owls live only in old forest in
North America. Their numbers have decreased to the
point where they have been declared a threatened
12

species. Consequently, large tracts of forest will be
closed to logging and development, many jobs will be
lost, and the price of wood products may increase.
Spotted owls declined in number because they require
old forest trees for their nests, and old forest is almost
gone. In other words, spotted owls cannot adapt
sufficiently to make use of younger forest.
Suppose that geneticists discovered that a certain
portion of the spotted owl's DNA coded for an unusual
protein. Suppose also that this protein is connected
somehow with the owl's insistence on old forest for its
nesting. Filially, suppose that it is possible to change
the genetic structure of the owls so that the unusual
protein is not produced, neither in the modified birds,
nor in their descendants. Should we create northern
spotted owls, version 2, so that they will survive even if
most or all of the old forest is gone?
Many questions immediately come to mind.
Wouldn't it really be playing God to modify an entire
species? Will we find that the modified owls are still not
adaptable enough to make homes in younger forest
due to other, currently unknown influences? Will they
be more vulnerable to diseases? Will the "version 2"
owls become too successful and drive out other
species? What other species might require old forest
and become extinct if we continue logging and
development?
The Bridge Analogy does not answer these
questions. Instead, it makes us realize that the situation
is too complicated for anyone to understand
adequately. Unlike a paralyzing relativism, the Bridge
Analogy suggests that we commit ourselves to our
favorite perspective, whether economic, ethical, social,
or scientific. But we are not to bind ourselves so
completely that we are unable to make contact with the
larger context of experience and general knowledge.
For example, if we believe that it is right to
manipulate the genetic structure of a species under the
proper conditions, we must still recognize our own
hidden agendas and the concerns of others. It is
possible that we would rather facilitate continued
logging and development or advance our scientific
reputations than make a better world. We also should
consider whether our technological achievement will
be counterproductive in other ways. Ideally, we would
know that we are capable of modifying a species, but
that we choose not to do so at that point in time.
If, on the other hand, we believe that it is not
appropriate to modify spotted owls, we must then be
prepared to address the social consequences. What can
be done for the people who depend on logging and
development for their livelihood? Will extreme
conservationist positions result in having many human
The Cresset

commumtles become threatened? If genetic
engineering should not be applied just to make human
life easier, we must still accept the fact that it is a tool,
and work with others in determining its appropriate
use.
It is seldom possible to know all the consequences
resulting from an action. Science and technology
provide us with limited facts and less limited, but less
certain models. Our social and religious traditions give
us additional models. Navigating among these small
facts and competing models requires that we cling to

tradition most of the time. When we recognize the
value of a new approach, while appreciating what our
tradition has to say, we should move boldly toward the
new approach. Can we demonstrate that our intended
actions are not just self-serving? Can we accept the
responsibility and the consequences if something goes
wrong? Have objective, knowledgeable people
examined our new models? When we can respond
afflrmatively to these questions, we should venture to
modify spotted owls. Q

A Translation: Wordsworth Wrote That
the world is too much with us,
wrote (like man possessed)
that there's little we see in
Nature that is
ours: not the sea
baring its bosom
on cue to the moon, not winds
that howl all hours (they harmonize
with us, and fill out his rhyme
with flowers)-for every thing he claims
we're out of tune; in other words
it (that is, all
of the above) moves us not
Thus the Poet, becoming the first person
singular, makes boldly
his departure, swearing
"Great God! I'd rather be a pagan
suckled in a creed outworn"
etcetera, leaving us (the aforementioned out
of tune, who get and spend and give
our hearts away)
to our devices, to stand on a pleasant lea
to be less forlorn, for glimpses of Proteus •.
to hear old So-and-So's horn.

John Ruff
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REVERSING THE TOWER OF BABEL
Shalini S. Venturelli
In his recently translated book on China, The Gate
of Happy Sparrows, Daniel Vave, an Italian diplomat,
describes an essay he wrote in a Chinese language class.
It was about a Chinese minister who objected to a policy of the Ming emperor, wrote his objections in a
memo, carried them to the palace, and committed suicide inside the palace walls. Vave's Chinese teacher
shook his head and handed back the essay. "You
ignore the rites prescribed for suicide," he said. "No
respectable person would act as your minister did ."
The minister would not have "attained his rank were
he unfamiliar with court decorum." Only the emperor
and his family, he counseled, may take their lives
inside the palace grounds.
Vave then asked his teacher to suggest an alternate
plot, which the teacher did:
Once upon a time there was a celebrated scholar w h o
visited an aristocratic family every week, and was served a
bowl of salted turnips as a mark of esteem. But one week the
scholar noticed that his favorite dish was absent. Realizing
that he had fallen from grace, he went to the foot of the
Western Hills and killed himself.
"Now that's a credible plot," the teacher said.
Vave objected, "But if I write that story, nobody in
the West will believe it."
"And if you write your story, nobody in China will
believe it," said the teacher. "Besides, I would lose face
if I permitted you to write it your way" (35-37).
Vave's account is about plausibility. Plausibility, that
is, in the construction of the narrative of reality, an
issue that extends beyond the peripheries of folktale,
art tale, or fiction to other forms of narrative construction. It is palpable and present in conflicting versions
of news in an information age. The cultural chasm in
rendition of daily events was never more clear than in
1989, when Western news agencies parachuted into
Tiananmen Square and flooded the information arteries of the world with their version of the massacre.
Outraged Chinese leaders saw Western news versions

Shalini Ven turelli has taught since 1986 in the Department
of Communication at VU. In addition to writing as a correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor, she has
worked in public radio and television.
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of the death of students within the palace walls as a culturally implausible violation of the court decorum
Vave's teacher describes, far less acceptable than the
honourable effacement of life and dissent outside the
palace in ritually discreet and distant forms. This is a
crucial distinction not in interpretation, but in reality
itself; and Chinese leaders reacted accordingly by
appropriating those centers engaged in the mass production of narrative: television, external broadcasts,
newspapers, radio.
Recently, the media has become the secret weapon
in political revolutions world-wide, emphasizing the
multiple developments in global communication that
are transforming the political and cultural environment of the planet. My essay describes my sense of the
implications in these developments, not only with news
flow, but with international movements of all types of
information, be they dramatic, narrative, political, scientific, economic, social, or commercial.
In his masterful study, Empire and Communications,
the Canadian scholar, Harold Innis demonstrates how
all societies, from Babylon to the present, have been
shaped by the production and distribution of information. His emphasis is on the unsettling effects of new
technologies, which he illustrates with the example of
Master Johan Gutenberg.
A citizen of Mainz, Gutenberg has just developed a
machine that can reproduce manuscript-like pages in
many copies. News of his work has reached the local
ruler, the Elector of the Rhineland Palatinate. In the
spirit of Renaissance inquiry, the Elector asks a group
of scholars and businessmen to assess the machine 's
impact on the local economy and culture. After careful study, their report recommends that the
government not invest research and development
funds in the project. Its reasons are direct and cogent:
First, a large work force of monks copying manuscripts
would lose their jobs if the Gutenberg machine were
encouraged; second, there is no heavy demand for
multiple copies of manuscripts; and third, the longterm market for printed books is doubtful due to the
low literacy rate.
Until now, major communication advances, as in
this fable of the Gutenberg printing press, could be
dealt with on a linear basis, phased in gradually with
time to allow the political and economic adjustments
The Cresset

needed to integrate them into the existing structures.
But technological change, growth, and complexity in
the planetary arterial system of information today prevents us from isolating variables and observing their
sphere of influence on human culture . We must,
instead, make sense of a multiplicity of variables in a
state of constant dynamic interaction with each other
and with local and regional cultures everywhere .
Anything one can say today about the chaotic system of
organic and explosive growth may be obsolete tomorrow. And so I doubt we can feel superior in our
analysis and projections compared with the utterly fallacious assumptions of scholars and businessmen in
fifteenth century Mainz.
We can agree, however, that in the new information age advanced nations will increasingly shift their
focus from the production and distribution of things to
the production and distribution of ideas. Let me try,
then, to develop a general paradigm of the larger significance and implications in the communication
explosion we see around us.
Some of these changes are suggested in broad terms
by the theologian-paleontologist Teilhard de Chardin:
Research, which only yesterday was a luxury pursuit, is in
the process of becoming a major, indeed the principle, function of humanity. As in the case of all organisms preceding
it, but on an immense scale, humanity is in the process of
'cerebralizing' itself. (173)
De Chard in's vision still seems Utopian .
Nevertheless, it is an early vision of the cultural
changes implicit in the evolution to a new kind of
information-rich society.
The West is heir to a tradition which saw the organization of available information as a basic condition of
human progress. It is the tradition of Ptolemy I Soter
(350-283 B.C.), who founded the great library of
Alexandria, the first attempt to gather all the world's
books in one place and catalogue them scientifically.
Its collection of perhaps 700,000 volumes was not
matched again until the past century. The destruction
of the Alexandrine library in 391 A.D. was a major disaster for Western civilization, reducing the stock of
organized knowledge to a few hundred manuscripts.
Fortunately, the tradition was kept alive by small
groups of Benedictines and other monks, who copied
and preserved the few works that survived. The next
step, following the invention of printing and cheap
paper, was the work of the French Encyclopedists and
their equally enlightened Scottish counterparts, the
creators of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Both attempted to summarize the world's knowledge in one set of
books. Their's was an astonishing effort, with-in the
case of the French-direct revolutionary implications.
The concepts spread to the development of the modern Alexandrine counterparts-the Library of
November, 1990

Congress, the British Museum library, and other great
library centers.
H. G. Wells' proposition of a World Brain in the
early part of this century, a project for gathering and
storing all information in one place, is realizable today
in computers. The 30 million volumes of the Library
of Congress, for instance, could be stored microelectronically in a relatively small room. Reduced to digital
computerized form, the Library's holding could eventually be transmitted in a few minutes over
high-capacity networks. The growth of such massive
data banks, linked to users throughout the world by
high-speed circuits, demands that we reconceive epistemological definitions about the nature of knowledge.
When knowledge can be generated and codified by all
individuals and information has been decentered to
the point of ultimate fractionization, then what can
terms such as culture and civilization ultimately mean?
The gospel of modernization is the doctrine of
organized universal betterment; it is a world-wide civil
religion, more influential than nationalism or such limited movements as democracy, fascism, or communism.
A psychic mass migration, via the media, toward a better material existence is an ideal that diffuses in ways
that irrevocably affect traditional institutions and values.
This gospel, speaking to the common desires of
human beings, is articulated by British critic Malcolm
Muggeridge in the following words:
What they all want is what the Americans have got.
Driving at night into the town of Athens, Ohio, four bright
colored signs stood out in the darkness-"Gas," "Drugs,"
"Beauty," ''Food." Here, I thought is the ultimate, the wgos
of our time, presented in sublime simplicity. A vision in
which suddenly all the complexity of life is reduced to one
single, inescapable proposition. These could have shone
forth as clearly in Athens, Greece, as in Athens, Ohio. They
belonged aptly in Turkestan or Sind or Kamchatka. There
are, properly speaking, no Communists, no capitalists, no
Catholics, no Protestants, no black men, no Asians, no
Europeans, no Right, no Left and no Centre. There is only a
vast and omnipresent longing for Gas, for Beauty, for Drugs
and for Food. (125)
Today, a new map of the globe is being drawn. It
is an information map that renders political maps irrelevant, comparable to a weather map perhaps that
indicates shared, global environmental conditions
rather than linear directions. This map shows a dense
mass of organized information centres over North
America, with smaller masses over Europe, Japan, and
the Soviet Union. Elsewhere, the density of information shades into thinness. A global knowledge grid.
The end result, if we're lucky, may be a stunning global
dimension to learning and knowledge, a dimension
that can convert a fixation on modernization into a
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powerful enculturation force.
But of course it could also be something else. The
communication fields are re-ordering a world view that
has been profoundly dominated by Western culture in
the last few centuries. Even before political philosophers and social sci en tis ts can catch up,
communication is remaking the epistemological foundations on which Western culture rests.
One version of the end of history posits a vision of
a world dominated by a single ideology-the victory of
justice and freedom over tyranny. For the end point of
the evolution of ideologies is the state that is liberal in
human rights, and democratic in government A universal, homogeneous state made possible through the
interconnectedness of networks of information and
ideas.
But what will the massive data bases serve in this
new picture? Perhaps the universalization of consumer
societies, to which social political ideologies matter less
and less, replaced instead by relentless consumerism.
New middle classes in Asia, Africa and Latin America
demand the goods, attitudes and standards of living
that characterize the other, wealthier communities of
the world.
The Chinese student uprising two summers ago is
a case in point, naively misjudged and misinterpreted
by the global press, who saw it as a cry for political freedom and democracy in the Jeffersonian sense of the
term. But while students may have bandied Western
labels, their's was essentially a rebellion to join the
ranks of global middle class consumers while remaining paradoxically subservient to oligarchic control.
The same phenomenon is evident in Eastern Europe.
The mounting misery of consumers creates the conditions necessary for violent upheaval and overthrow of
dogmatic ideologies in favour of access to information
networks and the products they bring.
And it is television, so often derided in the West as
junk food for the eyes, that has been the secret weapon
in Eastern Europe's revolution. The road to revolution
in East Germany was paved by the West German television seen in 85 percent of East German homes. It
showed there was another way to live. It showed the
loosening of travel restrictions and the rallies that
brought down Erich Honecker. In Romania, the
National Salvation Committee ran the country from a
barricaded TV studio as guards tried it blast ~t into
silence. The rebels were able to broadcast for days
while under siege from Securitate forces. Only the
broadcast of images of Ceausescu's dead body took the
steam out of the pro-Ceausescu forces and united the
nation behind the movement and reality.
Czechoslovakia's revolution, born in Prague, almost
sputtered out until the revolutionaries got control of
the nation's 1V and communication centres. Suddenly
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dissident writer Vaclav Havel and the rest of the Civic
Forum were talking to the nation, not just to the people in Wenceslas Square.
The information age also charts some dislocations
in the spatial/temporal ordering of civilizations.
Multiple, instantaneous transmissions create a universal culture unbound by space-the whole world
present in a single room which, at the same time, is
present in the whole world.
The idea of an age of the speed of light is really
that of information transmittal at the speed of light.
What happens then to the fundamental characteristics
of human culture, of cultural nationalism, which till
now has defined itself in terms of geographic, political,
historic difference, contradistinction and variance? We
may be compelled to envision cultural change in terms
of benefits that unify, not divide, all human beings.
According to Michael Geyer, the globalization of banking, economics, and information systems are replacing
primordial social environments by constructed rational
social models cascading from a massive avalanche of
texts--books, news, dramatic tele-entertainment, electronic information, and so on.
The prospects of the universalization of Western
culture and civil society has its daunting passages.
Where there is Coca Cola and Pepsi, there must be
capitalism, and where there is capitalism, there must
be civil society. Geyer suggests that this will be a society in which the only debate is that between the
economic interests of multinational corporations.
Between Coke and Pepsi. A world in which cultural
differences become essentially the realm of folk artpolitically and socially irrelevant
Speed also nullifies space. The spatial integration
of the world has made it unnecessary for us, at the end
of the twentieth century, to envision the world at all.
Today the world is a material totality as opposed to a
collection of regional collectivities. We already note
the emergence of points on the globe, centers that link
up interdependent networks of information, systemic
networks that leave no place outside the system.
Spatial metaphors of center and periphery, social scientists say, have ceased to work in a communication
fabricated world. No longer is there a single, powerful
Eurocenter, for other networks of power have replaced it
as territoriality and sovereignty are cast overboard, victims to the growth of communication networks and
speed of information delivery.
A more unified American consciousness--a sense
of sharing of common experiences, values and living
standards, the vision of a nation, a mass culture-- was a
consequence of the first coast-tlXoast radio broadcasts. So
too, on a global scale, planetary linkups in the information age have caused the territorial interests of nation
The Cresset

states to be radically challenged by the conforming
pressures of mass information. This is the sociology of
the world today. Culture is no longer a local process.
Global data banks and globally-shared video information mediate between the global and the local.
Commerce and communication have captured the
field of invention and dissemination of global culture.
Philosophy and intellectual thought has to catch up.
Rethinking cultural differences in an information
age forces us to acknowledge the dominance of vertical
relationships, those between interactive and privileged
networks of communication power and control, and
innumerable scattered locales.

I believe that throughout this process of change is
woven the subtext of prose itself. The course through
which flow explanations, stories, narratives of reality
that defme the world we live in. The human storyteller
traces tales in the Western world largely through three
cultural epochs.
The first is a pre-industrial, mnemonic age in
which memory and ritual, repetition and the accumulation of a limited set of stories about the origin of the
Universe, meaning of life and prescriptions for proper
conduct was dominated by tribal leaders responsible
for the interpretation of such stories. It is an a-rational
time in which ideas and information are meaningless
unless clothed in structures of myth, emotion, ritual,
and drama.
Then follows the industrialization of storytelling in
the age of print culture in which printed stories
become standardized commodities, movable packages
of consciousness that can be carried across boundaries
of time, space, language, religion, and status. Books or
rather texts now free people from their historic dependence on the ministrations and interpretations of
chiefs and priests. Written texts restructure the process of humanization, heretofore confined by
geography and relative stability, through rational discourse, highly valuing reason and logical
argumentation.
Finally, we see the telecommunications era superimposed upon and reorganizing print-based culture.
Television once again returns us to an ancient system
of storytelling that is oral, singularly dramatic, a centralized ritual, distant and pervasive, yet seemingly
personal and face to face. It disseminates a limited
number of story forms that describe and explain the
world once more in emotive, formulaic dramatic visual
argumentation that requires none of the linear premises of a print culture. We experience a series of myths
that make an otherwise diverse audience into a new
kind of community: the modem mass public. In terms
of its essential socializing functions, television is more
like tribal religion than it is like any other selectively
Nouember, 1990

used medium preceding it. It practically monopolizes
cultural participation and dominates the cultivation of
common consciousness as local parochial culture did
before the print era.
Incidentally, many non-Western cultures, such as
in South America, for instance, have leapfrogged the
values of ratiocination embedded in a print culture
and have arced from tribal storytelling to televisual storytelling in less than a decade. Accordining to Bradley
Graham's story in the Washington Post, television is
arriving in the backwaters of the world, in Latin
America reaching distant villages like Ocobamba, Peru,
often before running water, telephones, regular mail
service and-thanks to battery-powered sets-even
before electricity. In many of the poorest homes, a TV
set now ranks as the treasured next addition after a
kerosene stove. Before phones, before literacy, books,
print culture, these people want television. A way of
absorbing the world that demands no fundamental
change in the structure of knowing already possessed
by isolated, pre-literate societies. They seek to move
instantly from myths of ancestors and village culture to
electronic myths about distant places that may themselves be mythical.
This televised world still essentially promotes a
Western storyline from the Greeks to the present, a
narrative that has suppressed differences in establishing its own hegemony through several centuries of
technological change.
Such a narrative supposes a universal story line
that, since the Renaissance has advocated the progressive liberation of spirit from nature, a story of freedom,
is one in which the non-West plays the role of supplier.
Supplier of recognition. It is a story in which societies
either mirror the Western Prose of the World or appear as
mere distortions.
Today non-western societies look nostalgically at a
vanished world of their own uniqueness as they face
increasingly being incorporated by communication
networks into the Prose of the World.. They confront the
final spectacle of homogenization that began five centuries ago, that fixed identity of long ago which has
now become the abstraction of a past tradition dominated by an increasingly diminished variety of
legitimate prose forms wielded by the global media
oligopolies.

Will this universalized story lead to a global oneness? Is such a oneness desirable? In Genesis 11, God
said, "Let us go down and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's
speech." The Tower of Babel. Using the same
metaphor, international communication today appears
to be reversing the scattering of people. The homogenizing effect of exposure to similar experiences that
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stem from: (a) exponential increases in travel and
tourism (around 400 million people a year, according
to UN figures); (b) dependence of world media on a
limited number of international wire services--five to
be exact-so that a growing number of people are
exposed to the same news and information, in the
same format; (c) the cloning of the world's dramatic
storytelling by the television, videocassette, and film
industries; and (d) the standardization of material life
by the international mass marketing of consumer
goods and services.
Though Eastern Europeans, Asians, Africans and
Latin Americans kick and scream at being dumped
into this melting pot of standardized mass culture, they
also inveigh against any effort to deprive them of the
artifacts that modernize their lives. As people, they
hate to give up their ethnic, national, tribal, or community identities that set them apart from their
neighbours, but covet every convenience their neighbours possess. However, this is only a transitional
dilemma in the construction of a planetary communication age whose final form can only be conjectured.
A storiological history of Europe shows that the
creation of links between different peoples and languages was made possible through textual, rather than
military culture. Through the development and creation of a common set of texts, European civilization
was invented. Today this model provides us the means
to read and write culture anew. The nations of the
developing world have already pleaded with Western
communication oligopolies to develop multiple discourses in the recounting of in tern a tiona! and
intercultural narratives. Through a plan called the New
World Information Order, submitted to UNESCO, they
ask us to question how something gets to count as text,
as information, as a story in the mass media. They ask,
in other words, to question our principles of inclusion
whose assumptions have been unyielding and fixed for
half a millenium.
In its early years, UNESCO was dominated by the
conflict between the Europeans' esoteric cultural concerns and the Americans' pragmatic interests in
literacy campaigns, and scientific cooperation. The
organization is now dominated, for better or for worse,
by Third World concerns, reflecting the majority of its
members, and is now the spawning ground for the concept of information sovereignty, or the right to protect
one's cultural heritage from unwelcome outside influences.
In his popular book, Understanding Media, Marshall
McLuhan suggested the idea of a new global village
knit together and transformed by television. An information network would envelop the planet, he said,
spreading democracy and leading to a Pentecostal con18

dition of universal understanding and unity, a general
cosmic consciousness. That global village is growing.
Glasnost in the Soviet Union, stirrings in Eastern
Europe, and demands for openness in China all
respond in real measure to images of freedom transmitted by the penetrating networks foreseen by
McLuhan.
But, as Ben Bagdikian, writing in the the Nation,
points out, a handful of mammoth private organizations have begun to dominate the world's mass media,
and by their own admission, five to ten corporate
giants will control most of the world's important newspapers, magazines, books, broadcast stations, movies,
recordings and videocassettes by the 1990s. More
unsettling still, Bagdikian 's exhaustive examination
reveals that each of these planetary corporations plans
to gather under its control every step in the information process, from creation of "the product" to all the
various means by which modern technology delivers
media messages to the public. "The product" is news,
information, ideas, entertainment and popular culture;
the public is the whole world.
The men who run these empires Bagdikian calls
Lords of the Global Village. Some, like Rupert
Murdoch and Robert Maxwell are flamboyant figures
known to much of the literate world. Some are
obscure names in West Germany. All are media royalty
bent on capitalizing, Bagdikian says, on global technological and political trends, aided of course by
developments like fiber optics and satellites. They seek
to harvest that most profitable of all commodities,
human attention.
The lords of the global village have their own political agenda. Together, they exert a homogenizing
power over ideas, culture, and commerce that affects
populations larger than any in history. Neither Caesar
nor Hitler, Franklin Roosevelt nor any pope has commanded as much power to shape the information on
which so many people depend to make decisions about
everything from whom to vote for-to what to eat. The
fight for hundreds of millions of minds is among Time
Warner Inc.; Bertelsmann AG; News Corporation Ltd.;
Hachette SA; and Capital Cities/ABC,Inc.
Monopolistic power may dominate other industries, but these media giants have two enormous
advantages: they control the public image of national
leaders, and they control the information and entertainment that help establish social, political, and
cultural attitudes of increasingly larger populations.
They've received generous tax breaks and antitrust
exemptions from American and European lawmakers,
encouragements which appear to ignore the cautions
of thinkers like Jefferson and John Stuart Mill on the
dangers of collectivized thought.
In 1960, when the UN draft Declaration on
The Cresset

Freedom of Information was introduced, it had the
support of those who had in mind the controlled information of authoritarian governments. It was assumed
that once governments got out of the way, "the free
flow of information" and power of the public "to ascertain and appraise events" would be made possible by
free-enterprise media. They were correct. But the
problem, as Bagdikian points out, is not free enterprise, but the lack of it.
As authoritarian governments tumble around us,
the restraint of economic activity that reduces voices is
in danger of staying on, like the irritating guest that
refuses to leave when the party's over. For such reduction of voices has now become the function of
unrestrained growth in the size of media corporations.
The basis of all liberty-namely, freedom of information and knowledge-is threatened by that old familiar
scourge of the free spirit, centrally controlled information.

A vision of an inflexible, precise natural order first
drove the scientific revolution and then was absorbed
into social ideas. The transition of the metaphor was
subtle, facilitated by the assumption that, having
learned the rules of nature, we had only to apply them
to human society. The precepts of Newton and Darwin
were extended beyond their original contexts. This
possibly misapplied scientific theory pushed us toward
the brink of anarchy in the forced fabrications of social
order under fascism and communism. We could not
have survived another century if we continued to pursue such myths of scientific and technological
certitude. Fortunately, we now sense that something is
wrong, and the new philosophies of science confirm
our doubts. In physics, Einstein and quantum mechanics shattered the supposed order early in this century.
More recently, it is biology that has challenged the
extremes of Darwinian social views and offers some
hopeful analogs about human culture and destiny.
Biologist Lewis Thomas has noted, with grace and
clarity the ways in which new studies have questioned
older concepts of evolution as primarily a record of
open warfare among competing species, with survival
limited to the strongest aggressors. He points out:
The tiniest and most fragile organisms dominate the life
of the earth... The urge to form partnerships, to link-up and
form collaborative arrangements, is perhaps the oldest,
strongest and most fundamental force in nature. There are
no solitary free-living creatures; every form of life is dependent on other forms. (19)
Observations from the new biology parallel the
realities we face in coming to terms with the new
dimensions of international communication: thouNooembu, 1990

sands of Einsteins whose talents are liberated by the
microchip; millions of consumers whose consumption
patterns drive the destiny of human civilization.
How do we fit then the new communications and
information resources into a more mature re-ordering
of our personal and collective purposes, not as deterministic evolution but rather as a more harmonious
melding of the many-colored strands that fragment
world cultures? British scholar George Steiner has
noted the importance of molding communication systems in ways that do not sacrifice diversity to the
uncertain benefits of a centralized planetary culture.
He cites the role of the world's 10,000 languages in this
process:
Each and every tongue is a distinct window into the
world. looking through it, the native speaker enters an emotional and spiritual space, a framework of memory, a
promontory on tomorrow, which no other window in the
great house of Babel quite matches. Thus every language
mirrors and generates a possible world, an alternate reality.
(26)
Are we for cultural uniformity and universal
"lifestyles" as the advertisers now call it, or are we interested in preserving freedom though competing
cultural diversities, a multiplicity of voices? What systems of information will permit each of us, as Emerson
urged, to produce that peculiar fruit we were born to
bear? 0
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The "Values" of
Competition
Arvid F. Sponberg
Hoary subject, I know, but stick
with me for a little bit. If I don't
catch your attention in the next
paragraph or two, you can hop off at
paragraph five when I slow down for
transitional humor.
My title phrase is much on my
mind this Fall, and not only because
the university football team, as I
write, is wallowing at the far end of a
26-game winless streak. [The editor
would like it noted that we have won
a game in the intervening weeks.]
The phrase runs through my head
like the refrain of a maudlin ballad
because it crops up in places where I
wish it wouldn't.
Take education, for instance.
Here's the columnist, Robert Walters, quoting a 1986 report of the
National Governors's Association:
"If we first implement choice, true
choice among public schools, we
unlock the values of competition in the
educational marketplace. Schools that
compete for doUars will ... make those

Gus Sponberg teaches in the Department of English at VU. A student of
American theatre history, his book,
Broadway Talks wiU be published soon
by Greenwood Press. He regularly contributes to Campus Diary.
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changes that allow them to succeed." (emphasis added). Walters
also reports that in Prince George's
county, Maryland, parents "stand in
line for as long as three days and
nights to enroll children in widely
acclaimed magnet schools. "
Perhaps these parents also nurture their children by staying home
on other nights and helping with
homework. On the other hand,
maybe some of their children are
among those included in a survey by
the Department of Health and
Human Services, a survey reported
in a September issue of Sports fllustrated. HHS estimates that there are
250,000 adolescent steroid users in
the United States. Interviews with 55
users revealed that: 93% thought
that they had made a "good decision"; 87% would make the same
decision again "without hesitation";
more than 80% said that steroids
made them bigger and stronger and
that the resulting achievements
made them "more popular"; 85%
felt no peer pressure to stop; nearly
66% disagreed with the statement
that their coaches believed that
steroid use was a "bad idea"; 82%
disagreed with medical experts who
say steroid use poses long term
health risks, including liver and kidney disease and sterility.
In light of this information, the
phrase "values of competiton" looks
moronic-wait a minute-oxymoronic, a logical class that
currently includes "rap music," "savings and loan," and "guests of the
Iraqi government"
Those who speak loudest in
praise of the "values" of competition

often compare the marketplace with
the playing field. Yet in making this
analogy they almost always omit a
factor necessary to competition in
the athletic arena: the referee. The
important thing about referees is
that they watch every play and
penalize every infraction of the
rules-well, almost. In this behavior
they differ acutely from marketplace
regulators whose attention is often
desultory, at best. How much better
off would the depositors of Lincoln
Savings be today if a referee had
scrutinized Charles Keating 24
hours a day? Yet this element of
oversight, which is central to athletic
competition-<:an we even conceive
of baseball without umpires?-is
regarded by many as destructive of
liberties necessary in the marketplace.
Nevertheless, we are urged to
apply the "values" of competition to
education. I would ask, who will referee the school board meeting? the
teacher's lounge? the classroom? the
home? Who will insure the integrity
of the learning process while we parents exercise "true choice" by
camping in a cold dark rain outside
a "magnet" school, our behavior
barely distinguishable from that of
the other kind of "heavy metal"
fans? It is irresponsible to advocate
competition without stating how the
fairness of the competition will be
assured.
Of course, the proponents of
"true choice" reply, no one advocates unfairness. We simply wish to
help our students to become more
disciplined-and chief among the
"values" of competition is discipline.
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Some little reflection shows this
purported relation between competition and discipline to be otherwise
than popularly understood. Rather
than competition instilling discipline, discipline is a condition for
competition . In other words, the
source of discipline lies outside
competition, which cannot exist
without it. This is true in the stadium, the marketplace, and, most
plainly, in the arts.
As it happens, Valparaiso University is home for excellent
organists. In my time here, William
Eifrig and Philip Gehring have set
the highest possible standards for
teaching and performance . Last
year, Philip Gehring retired and
Martin Jean succeeded him in the
post of University Organist. Professor Jean, at the age of 30, is a
veteran of international organ competitions. As you read this, he will
have recently returned from a sort
of Super Bowl for Organists in Calgary, Canada. The organizers-a
group of entrepreneurs assisted by
Simon Preston, formerly the organist of Westminster Abbey-invited 40
organists to audition for the competition and selected 8 finalists,
including Professor Jean. He could
win $15,000 and contracts for
recordings and a recital tour.
I asked Professor Jean for his
views on the relation of competition
to education in organ performance.
He asserted that there is no necessary connection between the two.
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For example, he does not consider
it a primary purpose of his teaching
to propel every student toward the
goal of competitive virtuosity. Rather
he takes students at their own levels
and helps them find the paths
-and the discipline-appropriate
to goals they have set for themselves.
Unless one learns to love an activity
for its own sake, it is highly unlikely
that one will acquire the discipline
to master it. Competitions come
long after the discipline.
Professor Jean pointed out two
other consequences of competitions , neither of them positive:
"trepidation" and the temptation to
choose music known to be liked by
the judges. After more than a
decade of competitive experience,
he believes that he has, at last, mastered the fears that attend public
performance. However, the temptation to play it safe seems inherent in
competitions. In his preparations,
Professor Jean admits that he has
explored parts of the repertoire that
were entirely new to him. But overall , competitions encourage
conformity to mainstream tastes and
standards.
Let's end by returning to the
marketplace . A recent analysis of
Japanese methods of automobile
manufacturing illuminated another
defect of competition as a basis for
organizing human activity: secrecy.
According to a recent article in
the New York Times Magazine by
James Womack, in the United States,

"the relationship between mass production suppliers and assemblers
has been marked by mutual suspicion and distrust. The suppliers
jealously guard information about
their operations from the assemblers, lest it reveal the size of their
profits." In contrast to this secrecy,
Japanese assemblers "are privy to
the most sensitive information
about their suppliers' operations,
including costs and quality levels.
This is possible because the relationship between assembler and
supplier, and among suppliers, is
cooperative rather than competitive."
It may seem to be quite a
stretch from magnet schools and
steroid abuse to organ competition
and mass production. It isn't. The
connections among such different
topics show how deeply our lives are
permeated by the "values" of competition: secrecy, narrowness of mind,
fear, cheating and other varieties of
predatory behavior. In its defense,
we can say that competition, in the
marketplace, sometimes reduces the
cost of goods and services. In this
arena, properly regulated, it can
help to apportion and publicize
some rewards and honors. Nevertheless, as a solution to what ails
American education, the "values" of
competition deserve a cold eye until
the desire to be competitive as a
society is matched by the desire to
be fair and the desire to be good. 0

21

The Taming of the New
Edward Byrne

Campus discussions these days
tend to be asking about the controversies of the coming decade.
Although accompanied by other
candidates contending for the heat
of the media spotlight, already one
point for discussion, the contentious
debate over censorship, seems destined to cause ever more
controversy and to create even
greater conflicts in the upcoming
years. Perhaps no other domestic
issue has received more coverage by
the press and more attention by
artists or academics thus far this year
than that of censorship, and perhaps no other art form may be as
susceptible to the influence of public and political pressure brought
about by blatant or abstruse
attempts at censorship than commercial filmmaking.
Already in 1990 a number of
prominent films have been under
siege by censors or so-called (often
self-appointed and self-serving)
social watchdogs, and we see indications that this pattern may continue
well into the new decade. Among
Edward Byrne teaches in the Department of English at VU, where his
special interests are poetry and Modern
American literature. He unites regularly on film for The Cresset.
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the critically acclaimed films which
have garnered the most attention by
censors this year have been Pedro
Almodovar's Tie Me Up! Tie Me
Down!, Peter Greenaway's The Cook,
the Thief, His Wife, and Her Lover, Uli
Edel's Last Exit to Brooklyn, John
McNaughton's Henry: Portrait of a
Serial Killer, Zalman King's Wild
Orchid, David Lynch's Wild at Heart,
Luis Mandoki's White Palace, Phil
Joanou's State of Grace, Martin &orsese's GoodFellas, Bernardo Bertolucci's
TheShelleringSiry, and, most significantly, Philip Kaufman's Henry & june.
Throughout the year, a number of
these directors had either been
forced to edit their films in order to
avoid an X rating by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)
ratings board or had chosen to
release their films under the commercial burden imposed by an X
rating. Two (Greenaway and
McNaughton) had decided to distribute their films unrated as a form
of protest against a system which
they believed had stigmatized
movies containing serious, adult-oriented themes and subject matter
depicted in a realistic manner.
Pedro Almodovar's distributor, Miramax Films, filed a suit against the
ratings board that was rejected by
the New York State Supreme Court.

Except for the surprisingly vigorous ripple of displeasure voiced by
some critics, arising from concern
over the mildly violent scenes in
Steven Spielberg's Indiana jones and
the Temple of Doom, which led to a
minor amendment to the MPAA
ratings system and resulted in the
establishment of a PG-13 rating in
the mid-1980s, the last two decades
have seen few challenges to the ratings categories (G, PC, R, and X)
first established in 1968. This year,
however, instead of another mere
ripple of displeasure, a steady
stream of disbelief over the recent
ratings decisions, and a rising flood
of dismay threatens to overwhelm
the future of American cinema.
The history of censorship over
the cinema in America is as old as
the art form itself. At the turn of
the century, while moving pictures
were still being screened in nickelodeons, government institutions
and civic leaders, from the Chicago
Police Department to the mayor of
New York City to the U.S. Supreme
Court, had attempted to prevent the
viewing of selected films by the paying public. However, Hollywood
managed very early to persuade
public representatives that control
over content in films should be left
to private preventative boards which
The Cresset

would create codes for commercial
films. In 1921, after a number of
scandals concerning the personal
lives of film stars spilled across the
front pages of the nation's newspapers, the Motion Picture Producers
and Distributors of America (the
original title of the MPAA) was instituted. This body immediately
invited Will H. Hays, a former Postmaster General and an elder in the
Presbyterian Church, to head up an
office which would insure that
American movies upheld high
moral standards.
The Hays Office promptly drew
up a code prohibiting numerous
words and situations, and though
well-intentioned, it soon became
merely an obstacle for clever directors to work around. When married
couples were not allowed to be seen
in the same bed, when all dramas
were transformed into melodramas
because heroes could not be viewed
as weak nor villains be portrayed in
a sympathetic light, and when, after
prolonged arguments, a special fine
of $5,000 had to be paid by producer David 0. Selznick to the MPAA
simply to allow Clark Gable to utter
the word "damn" in Gone with the
Wind, the film community began to
realize the detrimental effects of a
censorship imposed from within.
Finally, in the 1950s a sequence
of Supreme Court decisions, recognizing film making as an art form
which was protected under the laws
governing free speech as much as
any other artistic expression, slightly
reduced the censorial pressures on
the film industry, and by the mid1960s Hollywood began to test the
limits of its new-found freedom.
These tests were necessary as directors attempted to adopt more
realistic approaches to film making,
reflecting the social tensions and
the political turmoil of the time.
However, the film industry once
again found itself under fire as reactionary groups began to blame
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those very tensions and turmoil
which plagued Americans' daily lives
on the subversive effects of movies.
In addition, films were accused of
influencing the youth of America
towards sexual promiscuity and
drug experimentation, as well as an
acceptance of violent behavior patterns; the messenger was once again
persecuted for the message.
In 1968, after an onslaught of
realistic and controversial films the
year before (including Bonnie and
Clyde, The Graduate, Cool Hand Luke,
and Guess Who s Coming to Dinner, all
of which won major Academy
Awards) the film industry retreated,
and the MPAA, joined by the
National Association of Theater
Owners, established the present-day
ratings system for films. Initially,
although such ratings are unacceptable to most artists, they at least
appeared to be an honest approach
at evaluating the maturity level of
the materials included in individual
films. Films with X ratings had
some trouble being box office successes, but in the first few years of
the system, the artistic intentions of
film makers were hardly tarnished
by the X ratings. In fact, two films
which were originally slapped with
X ratings, Midnight Cowbuy and Last
Tango in Paris, proved to be among
the most critically acclaimed films of
the era. Midnight Cowboy even went
on to win the Academy Award as
Best Picture for 1969.
However, over the course of the
last two decades, "X-rated" has
become a generic adjective applicable to any obscene or pornographic
materials, and any fihn with an X
rating was likely to find distribution
and advertising impossible in many
communities. Throughout the last
decade, an X rating, although not
technically an indication of obscene
or pornographic content, had acted
as one. Though it had been
designed only for the guidance of
parents with children, the X rating,

in effect, unfairly prohibited a fihnmaker from exhibiting his work to
the entire adult American public.
Jack Valenti, the president of
the MPAA, has stated repeatedly
that the ratings system allows parents to monitor their children's
viewing. However, he has refused to
acknowledge the possibility that an
additional rating might aid adults in
determining which mature films are
or are not truly pornographic. Recognizing the value of this service,
nevertheless, the movie community
had offered a compromise which
would alleviate, if not allay, all of the
current controversy: critics and filmmakers had suggested an additional
"A" rating for serious adult films
which do not display explicit sex in
the manner of pornographic films,
while maintaining the X rating for
true sexual exploitation films. With
this A rating all under the age of 1 7
would be prohibited from viewing,
but theatres and advertisers would
be more likely to acknowledge the
serious artistic content of the film,
thereby extending to the filmmakers
a potentially greater audience.
Still, Valenti has repeatedly
denied the need for a new rating
category and continued to lead the
industry towards further internal
conflicts, ratings skirmishes, and
public confrontations. Mter months
of escalating pressure (at first
brought on by independent filmmakers, but more recently applied
by the major studios) and amid
rumors that he would soon be ousted as industry spokesperson, Valenti
has made a move. Rather than add
another rating category, he finally
has recommended what amounts to
a mere change in nomenclature for
the more mature films-from X to
NC-17-and has filed for copyright
of the new rating, a decision certain
to promote more controversy.
Unfortunately, the prospect of
further public confrontations also
allows those individuals and organi-
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zations whose self-promotions have
flourished in this controversy-Rev.
R.L. Hymers, Rev. Jerry Fallwell,
Rev. Donald Wildman, and the
American Family Association-to
maintain a platform from which
they can pressure further for
restraints on artistic expression, not
only in film, but in all areas of
American culture. The nation
remains entrammelled by groups
who want to dictate to all what can
and what cannot be seen or heard.
Already a rock band has been tried
for allegedly contributing to the suicide of a teenager who listened to
their lyrics and (according to the
prosecution) heard subliminal messages in words which were not really
present; another rocker also has
been indicted on identical charges
in a separate case; a rap group has
been arrested for performing in
front of an audience consisting only
of adults over 21 who had to present
proof of age at the door, and has
had sales of its albums banned in
some parts of the country (even
though the albums are voluntarily
stickered with a cover-tag warning of
the content); a record-store owner
has been convicted on obscenity
charges for the first time in American legal history; a comedian has
been banned "for life" from an
entire television network; over one
thousand attempts have been made
to ban books in public libraries; and
an art museum director in a major
American city has been tried in a
criminal court for organizing an
exhibition of photographs.
As this fervor for control of
the arts flourishes across the country, and as the fever of intolerance
spreads from museum to music hall,
from the small screen to the silver
screen, one wonders whether or not
anyone is really accomplishing anything. Will we be better off for all
this effort?
It would be easy to single out
the political conservatives and fun-
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damentalist Christians as the sole
censors, a lonely group struggling to
control the hearts and minds of
Americans, but the alarming truth is
that this cloudy problem covers a
more immense area. As the ship
appears ready to capsize, those liberals huddled on the port side of our
political vessel are equally at fault.
The National Endowment for the
Arts braces itself against attacks
from the right, but meanwhile,
another NEA, the National Education Association, volleys from the
opposite side in support Among the
resolutions adopted for the 1990-91
edition of its constitution, the
National Education Association
"deplores any efforts by government
to suppress" artistic expression and
"supports the freedom of publicly
funded agencies" in awarding
grants. Still, the support offered is
sullied somewhat when one notices
that this is only one of the many socalled politically-correct positions
the association has designated for its
more than two-million members in
an attempt to discredit alternative
options of thought. The Nationai
Education Association also defines
politically-correct positions which its
members ought to hold on scores of
other issues-including affirmative
action, abortion, gun control, world
peace, ozone depletion, nuclear
weapons, statehood for the District
of Columbia, reparation of Native
American remains, and even mailorder brides.
In our institutions of higher
education similar attempts to control viewpoints and speech occur.
Ironically, in many colleges and universities, where support for freedom
of expression in art is ostensibly
nourished, where openness ought to
be championed, politically-correct
viewpoints on government, society,
and culture are vigorously promoted. Conspicuously manipulative
academic programs, slanted catalogue listings, and curriculum

adjustments privilege certain opinions. Speech itself, inside and
outside the classroom, is increasingly limited through newly-established
behavior codes. The University of
Michigan had its campus freespeech restrictions, banning all
language which might appear offensive to anyone, overturned recently
by the courts as unconstitutional,
but a number of other universities
continue to enforce restrictive
speech codes. At the University of
Connecticut, students can be
expelled for "inappropriate laughter" or "conspicuous exclusion of
another student from conversation"
anywhere on campus. Similar legislation against free speech exists at
the University of Wisconsin, Emory
University, the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford University, and
other leading institutions nationwide. In a number of bitter and
much celebrated battles which have
also reached the courts, Dartmouth
College has tried to control, limit,
or discredit the reporting by the student press.
In Chicago, liberal aldermen
and a liberal alderwoman have
marched into a museum gallery and
illegally removed a painting they
found offensive. In New York, the
actors' guild has attempted to subvert artistic freedom by deciding to
dictate racial casting for the Broadway production of Miss Saigon.
M'IV has launched a self-congratulatory campaign against censorship of
the arts, even though the network
itself has a long history of censoring or banning videos and
performers, including the very ones
they pretend to be supporting. And
in Hollywood, Spike Lee has
attacked such critically acclaimed
films as Driving Miss Daisy, The Color
Purple, Bird, and Round Midnight,
declaring that white directors, even
those as talented as Bruce Beresford
or Steven Spielberg, should be prevented from making films focusing
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on black characters, real or fictional.
Against the backdrop of all this
static from both sides of the political
spectrum, examining the consequences of dropping the old X
rating may provide an indication of
the way future discussion will go.
Perhaps since this decision will
receive as much public attention
and have as much direct affect on
the average citizen as any other
relating to regulation of the arts, initial reaction to the switch from X to
NC-17 can serve as an accurate
barometer by which to judge the
American social atmosphere and
may be an approximate indication
of the kind of action which eventually will be taken against other artists.
Most of the current censorship
attempts are made through economic actions resulting in restraint or
regulation of profit from performance as well as a restriction of
affordability for artistic endeavors:
viewers are asked to boycott products advertised on certain television
programs; filmgoers are told to
protest a film depiction of Christ's
crucifixion and to avoid video
chains which stock the movie;
record companies are coerced into
stickering albums, thus restricting
sales; concerts are cancelled due to
pressure from special interest
groups; funds are cut off from art
exhibitors by conservative members
of Congress; television stations and
newspapers reject commercials for
controversial rock stars and refuse
to carry advertisements for X-rated
or unrated films; and malls contractually prohibit their cineplex
theatres from screening such films.
Similarly, in recent years the maJor
studios have been demanding in
their con tracts that all directors
achieve an R rating before release
dates. An economic form of censorship has already limited or tamed
new art in all forms across the country.
This form of censorship is sig-
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nificant since it is economic clout
that has finally broken the MPAA's
steadfast refusal to amend the ratings system. Economic power is one
tool the film industry has at its disposal that almost all other
distributors of art forms do not;
therefore, some observers hope that
famous film makers now might lead
the arts' charge against the censorship siege. As long as the films
which were battling against the stigma of the X rating were small films
or independent productions mostly
directed by little-known directors,
the MPAA. stood firm. (This is the
same position in which the recording industry now finds itself, as the
groups most under attack so far
have been rap groups or heavy-metal bands, not mainstream artists.)
However, with Henry & June, the
new film by Philip Kaufman-a wellrespected director best known for
his mainstream movie, The Right
Stuff, and for an artistic gem, The
Unbearable Lightness of Being-the
MPAA was going up against a prestigious release by one of the major
studios, MCA/Universal. In addition, the film is more concerned
with two uncommon characters who
created erotic literature than with
the re-creation of exploitative, sexually explicit acts; Henry & june
investigates the love lives of a pair of
serious literary figures, authors Henry Miller and Anais Nin. After
receiving the X rating and having
seen appeals by others summarily
denied, Universal and Kaufman
enrolled the aid of heavyweight
attorney Alan Dershowitz. Together,
they launched a counter-attack
against the MPAA ratings board and
its system. Surely, Universal and
Kaufman argued through a publicity
campaign, ratings restrictions of
releases by major studios on the
basis of erotic content would be
unrealistic and would cost the film
industry millions of dollars. Additionally, given the easy attainment of

an R rating by even the most brutally and senselessly violent of films,
such restrictive measures would further diminish the credibility of the
ratings system in the minds of directors, critics, and patrons.
Finally, Henry & June was
released on October 5th in about 80
theatres nationwide, the first film
rated NC-17. The ftlm was promoted on selected television and radio
stations, and it was advertised in
major newspapers, including the Los
Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune,
and The New York Times. Most of this
promotion would have been impossible if the film had maintained an
X rating. However, it still remains to
be seen whether the new NC-17 rating will actually assist in allowing
more adults to see serious, controversial films. Immediately after its
release, Henry & june was banned,
of course, in some suburban Boston
theatres.
At the writing of this article, the
three major television networks have
not yet decided their individual policies towards allowing advertising for
films with the new rating. Many theater owners are unsure whether they
will allow films with the new rating
to be screened: enforcement of its
restrictions is almost impossible at
most multiplex theatres. Some suggest that the elimination of the
stigma of the X rating will increase
the likelihood that borderline films
will be pushed more frequently into
the most restrictive NC-17 category
by the ratings board. Others believe
the new rating makes it enticing for
directors to deliver more daring and
sexually explicit films. Many wonder
whether the new rating will indeed
legitimize clearly pornographic
films which presumably receive the
same designation as the serious,
adult films, or whether theatres will
be asked to split hairs if they must
decide individually which NC-17
films to screen and which ones to
prohibit

25

Legal conflicts? Studios must
now decide whether or not to allow
directors more freedom by eliminating the contractual insistence on
R-rated films, even if the studio's
support might not be backed by the
actions of the distributors and advertisers. Cable stations such as
Showtime, Cinemax, and Home Box
Office need to decide whether they
will carry any or all NC-17 films.
Because Valenti and the MPAA have
refused to add the A rating between
Rand X (or NC-17), video stores
will be affected when they face the
prospect of including films by highly-regarded filmmakers side-by-side
with truly pornographic materials in
their adult sections. Those video
stores which exclude X-rated films
from their shelves now must choose
whether or not they will include NC17 films as part of their inventory.
Something still is wrong when the
possibility, indeed the probability,

26

exists that Academy Award-winning
films by directors like Martin Scorsese, Philip Kaufman, and David
Lynch will be relegated to the smut
section of a video store.
As Congress, the courts, and citizens across the country continue to
debate the meaning or limitation of
free expression, as artists of all kinds
attempt to create new and admittedly controversial works, as academics
actively seek to speak out against the
constraint caused by campus speech
codes or politically-restrictive policies, and as filmmakers begin to
respond to the new ratings system,
clearly the widespread censorship
conflict will continue for some time.
Ironically, a wave of change is sweeping throughout Eastern Europe; one
nation after another finally is
enjoying a taste of the absolute right
to free expression which it had envisioned and envied--often through
Western images on the silver

screen--on our side of the Iron Curtain. Yet, many Americans still
seem uncertain about the necessity
of maintaining free expression,
especially of expression which
offends someone. The public display of differences, and the
celebrated debate over censorship
which has launched the 1990s, particularly in film (perhaps in some
sense the most public of art forms),
one hopes will serve at least as a
reminder for Americans of the value
and fragility of free expression. Such
a lesson is one that others around
the world are only starting to learn,
and that some of us momentarily
may have forgotten . 0

The Cresset

The Scholar
The chill air smacks
The dark-eyed boy,
Leaving rosy handprints
On his cheecks.
Bounding across the campus
With lanky strides,
He hides in the collar
Of a long, black, woolen coat
And tries to run from the cold.
A backpack perched
On a strong shoulder
Is filled with Russian plays
And Nieztsche
Because he is brilliant.
When he speaks, the world
Eagerly awaits each word
That falls like a gold coin
From his handsome mouth.
He does not feel mortal
On this winter day,
Gloved hands willing
To strike the sun.
This young Ahab
Is late for class,
But it does not matter.
As he trudges darkly
Through the sparkling snow,
In his mind, at this moment,
He is larger than time
And greater than God.

Kara LaReau
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Wendell Berry
and the Unsettling
of Academia
Thomas D. Kennedy
What Are People Fur7: Essays by Wendell
Berry. San Francisco: North Point
Press, 1990. 210 pp, $9.95 pbk.

On our campus, as on most university campuses in the United
States today, we're talking a lot
about multicultural awareness and
diversity and community. I profess
solidarity with those who are pressing for a diversification of our
faculty and student body. When I
look at my classes I see, almost
exclusively, young, upper-middleclass women and men from the
Midwest. This troubles me, perhaps
because my students seem too much
like me. I would enjoy a more
diverse student-body, and I endorse
the goal of multicultural awareness.
My experiences as an "outsider," as a
minority person, have been few, and
trivial, but nonetheless stinging.
Southerners grow-up feeling-and
talking-like outsiders, so we tend
to be treated that way, and the
Tom Kennedy is Book Review editor
for The Cresset. He teaches in the
Department of Philosophy at VU, where
his specialities are ethics and aesthetics.
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results aren't pleasant. So I think
my students might learn something
morally important by meeting people from a different culture or
ethnic group. I think they might be
improved, say, by talking to a fundamentalist Southern Baptist (such
encounters might teach Lutherans
patience, if nothing else) or a pentecostal African-American.
Community, too, I think a good
thing. My life, and the life of my
family, these past ten years has been
anything but settled; we've moved,
on average, about every two and a
half years. Rootless and wandering,
we have been packing up almost as
soon as we have finally satisfied the
prerequisites for community-the
trust of one's neighbors, a recognition of the goodness and the goods
of a people and a place and a love
for these, an appreciation of the
"differentness," the "particularness,"
of a people and a place. What
"community" we have known has
consisted of friendships with those
we have fortuitously discovered who
love something we love. Those
friendships are, of course, relations
of incommensurably great value, but
they are not community. I suspect
that most of our students have
known as little of community as my
family, and we and they are the
poorer for it. So I wish for my students community, although I realize
that those few students who have
known community will leave university alienated from their home
communities, and that other students will graduate from university
mistaking the cheap and shabby
"community" they know in their
Greek societies for the real thing.
Many administrators seem to

think that the most effective way-as
if effectiveness were all that mattered- to establish community is to
talk a lot about what a good thing
community is. And many administrators and faculty seem to think
that the only way students will learn
to appreciate and value, or at least
tolerate, those of other ethnic and
cultural groups is if we institutionalize it into the curriculum, is if we
introduce new subject matter and
new courses into an already complicated and, to our students ,
incoherent "system" of general education requirements. I think those
administrators and faculty wrong on
both points. So too, I think it can
be said, does Wendell Berry.
Berry lives, writes, and farms in
Port Royal, Kentucky. He has written some twenty-five books of
poetry, novels, collected essays and a
non-fiction work on agriculture, perhaps still his best-known work, The
Unsettling of America: Culture and
Agriculture (San Francisco, 1977).
His poetry frequently appears in
environmentalist and conservationist journals; his essays are often
re-printed in Harper's. Berry left
home as a young man to seek his
fortune as a writer, but found the
costs in
terms of human
goods-community, land, good
work-too great. (Some of these
concerns are captured in his recent
novel The Remembering (San Francisco: 1988).) So he moved back to
Henry County, where his father
farmed, where his brother now
farms, to farm and to write.
Berry writes, as many readers of
Harper's will recall, without the aid
of a computer. That essay, "Why I
am Not Going to Buy a Computer,"
The Cresset

which has lead many to dismiss
Berry as a crank, or worse, is included in this collection, along with
several letters it provoked, and
Berry's response to those letters. It
displays with brilliant clarity who
Wendell Berry is and what he
believes. He will not buy a compu ter because he is already too "hooked
up" to the energy corporations and
because he believes computer companies are no more virtuous than
energy companies. He will not buy
a computer because he does not see
that computers "... are bringing us
one step nearer to anything that
does matter to me: peace, economic
justice, ecological health, political
honesty, family and community stability, good work." The purchase of
a computer would eliminate the
need for his old Royal standard typewriter and, more seriously, would
cost his ccrworker, his wife, Tanyareader, critic, and typist- her job.
He will not buy a computer for the
same reason he does most of his
farming with horses-he does not
want to fool himself. He doesn ' t
believe he will write any better with
a computer, and he doesn't believe
we are better off with farmers who
employ the latest technology. He is
biting in his critique of universities
and computer use:
The professors who recommended
speed, ease, and quantity to me were, of
course, quoting the standards of their
universities. The chief concern of the
industrial system, which is to say the present university system, is to cheapen
work by increasing volume. ( 190)
Wendell Berry doesn't write
with a computer, but whatever it is
with which he writes, he writes well
enough. He writes, no doubt, as he
farms, for the writer and the farmer
are one. His style is simple, as are
his tools. He knows his land and,
having ruined a hillside in the past
by carving a pond into too thin a
slope, he is careful and modest in
what he attempts with his words.
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Writing, like farming, is meant to be
a healing work. He can write with
humor, as when he points out how
innovative he is in proposing that
computers not be used when their
use is the norm. More commonly
he writes with a wise and gentle care
for people, a faithful love for and
commitment to the ground on
which he stands and the dirt on
which we all depend, and an alarm
at our waste, at what we are demanding, without recompense, of our
land.
What Are People For7 is, it should
be said, as great a visual and tactile
delight as Berry's writing is aurally,
and that is high praise. The cover is
a deep red upon which is centered
Thomas Hart Benton's Polites, Farming and Law in Missouri; the pages
are sewn . (Every book I've seen
from North Point Press is worth
owning for its look and feel alone;
yet th ey are not expensive.) Berry
arranges his essays in this book into
three sections, an opening selection
of poetic essays on damage and
healing, the land and our lives the
objects of these actions, a middle
section of book reviews and reflections upon good people and good
writing, and a final section in which
he addresses his familiar themes of
culture, learning, the economy, and
nature.
The book's title essay, "What
Are People For?" is an exploration
of the thoughts and affections which
underlie the comments of the agricultural economists that the
national economy and we as consumers are better off with the failure
of many family farms, for it is only
the "least efficient producers" who
are failing. Berry points to our soil
erosion rates, the dissonance of
urban centers and the numbers of
"permanently unemployable," (to
use the language of the bureaucrat)
who have abandoned the land for
the city, the destructive character of
contemporary farming techniques,

and the ruin this promises for our
future food supply as evidence that
the problem is not too many small
farms, but rather our contemporary
assumptions about human nature
and what the human purpose is.
People are not for, the human purpose does not lie in, consumption,
Berry maintains; but it is because we
value so highly a life-style of everincreasing consumption that we put
such a premium on "labor-saving
measures, short workdays, and
retirement," a cause, along with our
rate of consumption, of our social
ills. What people are for, is work,
good work. Despite the daily failure
of a family farm, despite increasing
levels of unemployment, there
remains work to be done.
In the country, meanwhile, there is
work to be done. This is the inescapably
necessary work of restoring and caring
for our farms, forests, and rural towns
and communities--work that we have
not been able to pay people to do for
forty years and that, thanks to our fortyyear "solution to the farm problem," few
people any longer know how to do.
(125)

Wendell Berry is, then, a kind
of economic philosopher. He diagnoses our current problem as, to
put it inelegantly, but accurately all
the same, consumerism. He is not
naive about the explanations for our
consumerist mentality; it is not
merely a matter of individual tastes
and values. Part of the problem is
"the centralization of our economy,
the gathering of the productive
property and power into fewer and
fewer hands, and the consequent
destruction, everywhere, of the local
economies of household, neighborhood, and community," (p. 128) in
short, too little diversity. Pollution
and waste and unemployment, are
inextricably linked, the consequences of economic centralization
and consumerist values.
The solution to our contempcr
rary crises is not quite so simple as
cutting our consumption and
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returning to the land where there is
good work, although this might be a
more viable alternative than most of
us are ready to admit. Our problem
is fundamentally a moral problem, a
problem of wanting what we ought
not have, of wanting more and different than what is appropriate for
us. Our problem lies in the moral
character of individuals. Berry's
hoe is painfully true, I think, in his
essay "A Remarkable Man," as he
writes about Nate Shaw, a black
farmer from Alabama who spent
twelve years in prison because of a
stand he took against some white
sheriff's dep tuies, before he
returned to a life of farming.
"Shaw," he writes:
burdens us with his character. Not
just with his testimony, or with his
actions, but with his character, in the
fullest possible sense of that word. Here
is a superior man who never went to
school! What a trial that ought to be for
us, whose public falsehoods, betrayals of
trust, aggressions, injustices, and imminent catastrophes are now almost
exclusively the work of the college bred.
What a trial, in fact, that is for us, and
how guilty it proves us: we think it ordinary to spend twelve or sixteen or
twenty years of a person's life and many
thousands of public dollars on 'education'-and not a dime or a thought on
character. Of course, it is preposterous
to suppose that character could be cultivated by any sort of public program.
Persons of character are not public
products. They are made by local cultures, local responsibilities. That we
have so few such persons does not suggest that we ought to start character
workshops in the schools. It does suggest that 'up' may be the wrong
direction. ( 26)
Character, Berry maintains, is
developed only in community, only
in a local culture where people and
place and a way of life are known
and loved, where individuals can see
that there exist goods to be valued
independent of their desires and
abilities to purchase these goods.
Berry does not whitewash local cul-
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ture. Any community that can form
character can form bad or corrupt
character as easily as good. Local
cultures, too, will need something to
save them. But they still, at least for
the time being, have the vision to
perceive "the marks and scars of an
exploitive national economy," a
memory of how community worked,
and the independence to restore
some measure of community and,
hence, of character.
If the schools and universities
cannot produce people of character,
at least what we might try is to avoid
corrupting the good character that
has developed in our students
before they arrive at college. But, as
Will D. Campbell, Wendell Berry,
and Berry's writing mentor, Wallace
Stegner, have pointed out, contemporary university education is
alienating and corruptive; we tend
to take more away from our students
than we give them in return. Thus,
in Stegner's words, education
moves students " ... away from the
people and society they know best,
the faiths they still at bottom accept,
the little raw provincial world for
which they keep an apologetic affection." They deposit their affections
with us, an investment they lose,
receiving only a return of data.
We do this to our students by
jerking them out of their communities, dropping them in to a place
with people about whom they know
little or nothing, people who may
feel, at best, pity and perhaps outright disdain, for their "parochialism."
There are but two curricular options
from which students can choose;
courses are to be chosen either
on the basis of personal preference or arbitrary institutional
demands, either, "Take whatever
courses you wish to take; it really
doesn't matter what," or "These are
the general education requirements
which must be satisfied prior to education and these are your major
requirements, because we say so."

With these two curricular options
alone we force the student into
either an education which places
her at the center of the universe, or
which places her in a universe so
vast and disjointed that her identity
no longer matters.
To compound our attack, in
our courses we demand that students approach their subject matter
impartially, ignoring their identities,
who they are and how they have
become who they are. An education
so alien to a student's identity and
story or, at least, to the story of
those students whose history consists of something more than a series
of purchases in an incoherent narrative, inevitably reproduces in
students the same alienation their
professors, isolated and competing
with one another for students, raises, grants and tenure, feel.
Knowledge becomes a mere collection of data to be purchased, at
one's convenience, and added to
one's stock of non-perishable consumer goods.
It is the fact that multicultural
awareness is to be added into this
academic context that gives me
pause. Students, who are led by contemporary American university
curriculums to believe that they
rightly love themselves above all or,
on the contrary, that their own personal history is so small and
unimportant as to be unworthy of
any type of intellectual exploration,
who are led by the curriculum to
believe either that they are everything or nothing, will become
appreciative of other cultures upon
taking a course or courses in which
another distant and alien culture is
introduced to them? A mere addition of data to the file, I suspect It
is not because our culture, whatever
that is, is the only one of value and
significance that I am hesitant about
multicultural awareness; it is rather
because all cultures, or almost all
cultures, have a dignity and worth of
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their own that I am reluctant to
impose upon other cultures the
same indignity of commoditization
and, hence, trivialization, that our
cultures have been subjected to.
Most curricular suggestions for multicultural awareness amount to, and
can amount to, little more than
additional data to be stored in the
memory-banks of our students .
Additional data will not make our
students wise and will not change
character and we are naive to think
it will.
What would a curriculum look
like that was more likely to produce
the character needed to preserve
and care for the earth? Berry suggests that the essential requirement
is that it recognize "the primacy
between individual people and individual places." Whatever our ethnic
heritage, recognizing our love for
this place, this country-a "beloved
country" particularly loved-we
could start thinking about how land
is used in our country. In thinking
about how land is used, Berry
demands that economists and scientists, even if they themselves have no
love for the land , admit the
"demands, checks, and corrections"
of people's affections for the land.
"To be well used, creatures and
places must be used sympathetically,
just as they must be known sympathetically to be well known."
The humanities, no less than
the sciences, ought to be spared the
affectionless approach of objectivity
and specialization, Berry contends.
The humanities, too, must take a
"beloved country" as context:
Without a beloved country as context, the arts and sciences become
oriented to the careers of their practitioners, and the intellectual life to
intellectual (and bureaucratic) procedures. And so in the universities we see
forming an intellectual elite more and
more accomplished in procedures such
as promotion, technological innovation,
publication and grant-getting. The context of a beloved country, moreover,
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implies an academic standard that is not
inflatable or deflatable. The standard-the physical, intellectual,
political, ecological, economic, and spiritual health of the country--cannot be
too high; it will be as high, simply, as we
have the love, the vision, and the
courage to make it (117) .
Wendell Berry believes that the
future of our land requires a coming together of the sciences and the
humanities "in the presence of the
practical problems of individual
places, and of local knowledge and
local love in individual people."
The sciences and humanities must
"mend their divorce" not only at the
university level, but must mend their
divorce from common culture, if the
land is to be worked well, if we are
to survive as people.
Berry's recommendations are
no more specific than this, but they
do present a challenge, a challenge
which I fear too few universities
have the courage, or the finances
which make possible the courage, to
meet. Tuition-driven universities
with small endowments are irremediably conservative-we cannot risk
instituting expensive programs that
are out of sync with what other "recognized" universities are doing. We
dare not risk something too innovative, even if our students and our
land would be better off with the
innovation, lest the private and corporate interests to which we are
beholden withdraw their support.
Lutheran universities, whatever they
are freed from, are apparently not
freed from looking over the shoulder of "successful institutions," of
imitating them at every point from
curriculum design, within and without departments, to tenure and
promotion, to salary decisions.
That, I think, is regrettable, because
I suspect it is only the church-related universities and colleges,
African-American colleges and universities and, perhaps, women's
colleges and universities, in which
there is enough of a shared life and
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a coherent story to take the educational and political risks that may be
necessary for the development of
wisdom and character and the salvation of the land.
It is this beholdenness to the
industrial complex, this want of
courage in American universities,
this refusal to risk innovation lest we
lose academic respectability, this
arrogance in which we think we are
doing something worthwhile when
we convey merely knowledge, but
not wisdom, that Berry finds so
unsettling. It is because he recognizes the failure of universities, our
pretentiousness and our vices, and
points these out to us, that I and the
academy find Wendell Berry so
unsettling.
Although I was not raised on a
farm, I grew up around farmers. I
grew up knowing and loving a particular place, a piece of land, now
left far behind. I knew where you
could quickly and easily leap across
the creek, where the mud would
suck your feet like quicksand,
around which bend you might find
minnows, and where there was, in
springtime, a stand of dogwoods
lovely enough to make an adolescent male cry. My children will not
grow up knowing and loving such
things. My children's children may
not discover land to which such joy
and love can be attached. I am sorry for them. For their sakes, I trust
they will come to know someone
with the character of Nate Shaw,
someone with the wisdom and affection and delight in the land as
Wendell Berry. That they, and others before and after them, may read
Berry's writings gives me hope.
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World Lutherans
Look at Creation
Richard D. Dunning
Creation-An Ecumenical Challenge1
Selected Papers from the Study, Creation,
etc., Undertaken by the I~stitute for
Ecumenical Research, Strasbourg,
France. Lutheran World Federation,June, 1990.
The struggle to articulate a
coherent positive environmental
stance, grounded in the Christian
tradition, has gone on for at least a
quarter of a century; it has intensified since Lynn White delivered his
1966 paper, "The historical roots of
our ecological crisis," linking
destructive Western attitudes toward
the environment to the Judea-Christian tradition. Amid growing
concern over environmental problems, the debate about the role of
religion has increased. The Lutheran World Federation has added yet
another dimension to the conversation in its recent document,
Creation-an ecumenical challenge1
The document, a summary of interfaith dialogues on the potential
ecumenical perspectives on and value of creation theology, is
illuminating, but leaves its key questions unresolved. Before describing
the LWF document, however, a brief
discussion of the general context of
the debate is in order.
Two articulate voices in this
debate include the books Imaging
Richard Dunning teaches geography
and geology at Normandale Community
College in suburban Minneapolis. He
also teaches a course in environment
and religion at St. Olaf College with his
wife, L DeAne Lagerquist.
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God-Dominion as Stewardship by
Douglas John Hall, and The Travail
of Nature by H. Paul Santrnire. Both
authors, responding to the White
Paper, are careful to say that the
Christian religion is not the cause of
environmental problems, but both
also specifically use the term
"ambiguous" to describe attitudes
toward the environment within the
Christian tradition.
Ambiguity arises from the fact
that Christian writings through the
centuries seem to include both positive and . negative attitudes toward
nature. Hall discusses themes in
Christian theological discourse that
contribute to the ambiguity: a
detachment or disdain for the world
and worldly things as antispiritual;
an apocalyptic vision of the. destruction of the world; faith that
emphasizes personal salvation; a
strong influence of Hellenistic culture; linguistic confusion that arises
in scriptural interpretation; and
confusion over the relationship
between divine sovereignty and
human will. Santrnire traces the history of this ambiguity about the
environment in the thought of influential writers within the Christian
tradition.
Even when not addressing
direct criticisms, Christian leaders
frequently confront competition
from non-Christian traditions which
seem to offer more fertile and more
attractive environmental positions.
Some of the other traditions
that do address the environment in
their teachings and conversations
include Native American spirituality,
nature spirituality, feminist spirituality, new age spirituality, and secular
humanism. Christians, distrustful of
the faith claims of these other traditions, have tended to react against
any of their positions.
White articulated a key insight,
echoed by many writers since,
including Hall and Santmire (and
LWF): people's attitudes toward the

environment are fundamentally
grounded in the ways people understand self, other people, and the
world around them. Religion is the
thing that most shapes basic understandings of self and world-many
times indirectly through the vernacular uses of religious concepts
within a culture. In Western societies, since it is the Christian
tradition which one way or another
forms the basis of so many cultural
values, at this level, the ambiguity of
Christian theology with respect to
the environment is potentially most
dangerous. Christian teachings are
subject to so many mistakes and misapplications.
Recognition of
theology's profound impact on the
environment via its shaping of culture and values sounds for
theologians one of their most
important callings.
Certainly an important reason
for improving the theological literacy of the citizenry is the need for
critical examination of fundamental
attitudes about self and the world
within a society.
The scientific community can
describe the environment, the way it
works, the problems that confront
it, and the implications of various
choices that people make about
their lifestyles and uses of resources.
Ultimately, however, in most moral
dilemmas, the choices people make
depend less on objective analysis of
scientific facts and more on deepseated ethical principles and
cultural norms. Joseph Sittler pointed out that: "A change in 'the spirit
of our minds' requires something
vastly more than a combination of
frightening facts and moral concern."
The Lutheran World Federation
document provides an opportunity
to observe theologians wrestling
with the theological doctrine of creation and its implications for the
current environmental debates.
The document summarizes the
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results of a multi-faceted study by
the Institute for Ecumenical
Research, Strasbourg, France, over
the period 1982 to 1987, comprising
three interdenominational consultations on creation theology and two
research projects. The purpose of
the study as described by Bishop Per
Lonning, one of the leaders, was "to
explore dimensions of interrelatedness between creation faith and
contemporary ecumenical rapprochement."
The study succeeds at maintaining its focus on creation theology
and in raising questions which, as
described below, address some fascinating topics. The results are
presented summary form, however,
and leave out more than they
include, especially in the sections on
the interdenominational dialogues.
The results are presented summary
form, however, and leave out more
than they include, especially in the
sections on the interdenominational
dialogues. Each of the participants'
presentations is summarized in a
paragraph or two and, as a result,
they are too disjointed and insufficiently developed for most readers
to follow the theological arguments.
Points of disagreement, even within
individual traditions, are left as
unresolved questions although that
might be expected in the early
stages of such a project. Nevertheless, some points are interesting
even to the casual reader.
The first consultation was structured around "the vision of creation
historically characteristic of six main
confessional traditions." The session titles listed here are meant to
reflect some of the central concerns
of each tradition with regard to creation:
Orthodox: Theosis- the aim of
creation.
Roman Catholic: Nature and supernature--the dimensions of creation.
Anglican: Incarnation and sacrament-a key to creation.
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Lutheran: Creation and recreation-continuity in discontinuity.
Reformed: Creation in the light of
covenant.
Free Church: No to the "world" as
YES to creation.
The second consultation
addressed contemporary challenges
to creation theology within four
large themes:
"Theological discourse on creation
-Christian or pre-Christian,"
"Being-becoming-actuality: ontological implications of the concept
of creation," "Creation faith and
responsibility for the world," and
"Creation or sacrality of the created."
The third consultation, held in
the United States, centered on "the
cultural presuppositions underlying
traditional creation theology"
through the comments of representatives from North American
minority cultures (Native American,
Black, Hispanic, and Asian).
The descriptions of individual
presentations provide a few useful
comments, but the summaries of
the en tire consultations are more
coherent. In his summary of the
first consultation, Per Lanning lists
several points as most compelling:
First, "the ecumenical issue is not
creation per se, but how creation
re~ates to history/revelation/salvati~n "; Second, "the traditional
East/West controversy has been
influenced by a different understanding of salvation: restoration of
a creation more or less damaged by
sin, through satisfaction/forgiveness/repair (Occidental), or a
scheme for perfection of creature
in built already in the \primordial
vision of creation (Oriental)" ;
Third, "How is the correspondence ... between creation and
sanctification of the created universe in the sacraments to be
understood?" Fourth, "the sequence
of simple chronological observation
-creation comes first-might be of
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more theological relevance than
generally supposed." Again, however, these points, while interesting
and perhaps useful as directions for
future conversations, are not fully
discussed within this document.
The LWF document also reports
on Mark Ellingsen's research project
analyzing hundreds of post-1964
statements issued by church bodies
on contemporary social issues. He
considers how the doctrine of creation functions as warrant for
ethical positions.
The statements address a wide
variety of social issues but few of
them are specifically about the environment or creation. Ellingsen
observes that "by far the predominant approach to ethics in the
statements of all the churches considered collectively is to appeal to
Christology as warrant, bypassing
the creation doctrine."
Perhaps the most interesting
observation is a "striking agreement
on ethics among the churches, even
among those from radically distinct
cultural contexts" in their social
teachings. According to Ellingsen,
this "suggests the irrelevance of
theological disagreements in determining the churches' practice. For in a
number of cases, churches reflecting different understandings of the
doctrine of creation, different
modes of theological argumentation
for authorizing their ethic, still
arrive at similar ethical conclusions."
The second research project
summary describes an attempt to
obtain additional information from
Third World countries by using a
questionnaire.
One issue not addressed in
these discussions is suggested by
contemporary ethicists who describe
an ever-expanding circle of ethical
relevancy as including more groups
of people and animals and ultimately perhaps plants, soil, rocks, rivers,
and the planet itself. Will such a
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growing ethical consciousness ultimately change the meaning of
ecumenism to include the nonhuman members of the creation?
The LWF document is illuminating as a glance into the ambiguity of
the Christian understanding of creation; it helps illustrate the fact that
there is in fact no single doctrine of
creation shared by all denominations. And creation is only one of
the issues which must be resolved in
attempts to formulate a coherent
positive Christian stance on the environment.
Differences of understanding
do exist and may provide significant
barriers between denominational
groups. Unfortunately, but perhaps
not surprisingly, the document provides no point at which to begin
resolution of the differences. Even
the questions posed at the beginning of the document are not
addressed directly: can ecumenical
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dialogue improve the understanding of creation theology and
environmental attitudes and does
creation theology provide a fruitful
basis for ecumenical dialogue? The
first question may be answerable
indirectly. Given the role of religion
in shaping fundamental values and
given the many differences that exist
in the understanding of creation
and the role of humans .within creation, genuine environmental
progress may be impossible without
vigorous efforts at ecumenical dialogue and theological education in
the widest possible definition of the
words.
&ientists warn that the changes
necessary to slow the present
human impacts on the Earth's
ecosystems must be dramatic and,
because the results of such efforts
will be slow, must begin soon, as the
window of opportunity is decreasing. If the necessary lifestyle

changes require fundamental
changes in society's attitudes and
values, then those changes of heart
must begin even sooner. If the
world must rely, for its future, on
widely accepted religious values
informed by coherent theology,
then the LWF and all other international and interdenominational
bodies must be sent back to their
conference rooms and congregations with an urgent sense of
purpose and openness. For people
interested in exactly that task, the
LWF document is probably not the
best starting point because the content of the discussion is minimal.
The document will still have value
for other dialogues on these issues
in the questions it raises and in the
structures described for organizing
the consultations.O
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